			  
			   Alexander Mikaberidze
			    (amik78@hotmail.com)


                              Peter Bagration
                      "The Lion of the Russian Army"

                                 Chapter I

     Peter (Ivanovich) Bagration descended  from an ancient Dynasty of
     the  Georgian  kings -  Bagrations.  Their  genealogy comes  from
     region  Tao-Klarjeti ("Kingdom  of  the Georgians")  that can  be
     singled out among provinces of Georgia.

     In the  second half of the  10th century, during  the rule of the
     distinguished  political  figure  David Kuropalates,  great-great
     forefather  of the  Peter Bagration.  ("Kuropalates" is  a honour
     title given by the Emperor of the Byzantine Empire), Tao-Klarjeti
     became a large and  powerful principality, whose southern borders
     reached lake  Van and  the town of Erzink  (Erzincan). The growth
     and  consolidation   of  this  principality   contributed  to  an
     expansion of  its cultural and economic  ties with other kingdoms
     and  principalities. King  David  Kuropalates even  interfered in
     some  internal affairs  of the  Byzantine Empire. Thus,  in 1079,
     during a  rebellion against the Emperor  Basil, David Kuropalates
     sent him  reinforcement troops  led by Tornike  Eristavi, thereby
     helping  the monarch of  the great  Byzantine Empire to  save his
     throne  and  his  empire.   David  Kuropalates'  name  was  known
     throughout the  Orient, where  he commanded great  authority. The
     Armenian  historian Stepanos  Taronets, a contemporary  of David,
     wrote:  "The great David Kuropalates  surpassed all the rulers of
     our time  ... He established  peace and good will  in all eastern
     states,  especially, in  Armenia and  Georgia. He  put an  end to
     wars...and  defeated  all  the  peoples living  around,  and  all
     monarchs  submitted to  his  authority of  their own  free will".

     David Kuropalates initiated the political unification of Georgia.
     Supported  by   Joane  Marushisdze,   his  contemporary  Kartlian
     (Iberia) Eristavi and  active political figure, David Kuropalates
     raised his  adopted son Bagrat Bagration  to the throne of Kartli
     (Iberia) (in 975) and Abkhazia (in 978), thereby actually uniting
     Eastern and Western Georgia into a single state. Since then a new
     royal dynasty of Bagrations  originated and governed over Georgia
     throughout of almost 900 years.

     Among  the ancestors  of P.  Bagration there were  such prominent
     Kings and  statesmen, like the greatest  King of Georgia David IV
     the Builder, who liberated  the country from Seljuks and defeated
     on Didgori  valley on 12 August, 1121 by an  army in 55,000 men a
     coalition of  all Muslim State in  450,000 men; legendary empress
     Tamar,  the period  of  which reign  was  a "Gold  Century" in  a
     history of Georgia; King George VI the Brilliant, who expelled in
     1334  Mongolians   from  Georgia  and   released  those  Georgian
     monasteries on the Sacred Earth, that were taken by Muslims; King
     George VII, who fought  with most furious enemy of Georgia, Temur
     (Tamerlan) who  invaded 8 times in  Georgia during 14 years, have
     razed  it to  the ground,  but could  not managed to  conquer it;
     Kings Bagrat  V, Luarsab,  Simon, Irakli II and  many others, who
     assemble the Glory of the Georgia...

     Among the ancestors of Peter Bagration, there was a king Vakhtang
     VI, outstanding state and  public figure of Georgia of first half
     of XVIII.  In 1723 after several years  of struggle with Iran and
     Turkey, Vakhtang VI was  compelled, together with retinue of 1200
     men, to abandon Georgia.

     The  nephew  of king  Vakhtang  VI, Alexander  Bagration (son  of
     Vakhtang's brother  - Jese),  who stayed in  Georgia for struggle
     against Turks,  also was forced in 1757  to move in Russia, where
     he   has   continue  a   military   service   in  Russian   army.

     He  took part  in  a grade  of the  lieutenant colonel  in battle
     actions of  Russian armies  on Northern Caucasus on  a defense of
     southeast  borders of  Russian  Empire. There  passed a  military
     service his son Ivan Bagration.

     Up  to a  grade  of the  colonel, Ivan  Bagration  has left  in a
     resignation and put up  in city of Kizlyar, where in 1765 his son
     Peter,    future    famous   Russian    commander,   was    born.

     The  children's years  Peter carried  out in the  parental house.
     Unfortunately, any  certain items of information  about this part
     of his life have  not reached up to us. It is possible to assume,
     that,  being brought  up in  family of officer,  Peter frequently
     heard  the  stories of  his  father  about the  spent fights  and
     campaigns,  about the  courageous struggle  of the  native people
     against enemies. Maybe for this reason, since early years, he has
     shown large  interest and love to  military business, dreaming to
     devote itself to a  trade of the militarian. "With the milk of my
     mother, I have poured in myself a spirit of dash bravery" - wrote
     subsequently Peter Bagration.

     Soon  his dream  was  fulfilled. On  February 21,  1782 17-year's
     Bagration has started a  military service. He was enlisted as the
     sergeant in Caucasian Musketeer  Regiment. His military career of
     almost 30 years has began.

     Caucasian  Musketeer  Regiment,  together  with  other  parts  of
     Russian army,  defended southern  border of Russian  Empire which
     was  taking  place on  the  rivers  of Kuban  and Terek.  Ottoman
     Empire, holding then in the submission a significant territory of
     Caucasus,  organized   continuous  attacks  on  Russian  borders.
     Sometimes it managed to involve in participation in these attacks
     groups  of separate  princes ("Knyaz")  of Northern  Caucasus. To
     Russian armies, who were deployed on the Caucasian border, it was
     essential to be constantly in a condition of battle readiness and
     to reflect to enemy's attacks.

     In one  of fights with Highlanders  (particularly with Chechens),
     Peter Bagration  was wounded and  left on a field  of fight among
     the killed  and wounded  soldiers. Chechens, who  were assembling
     the weapon  and accepted young Bagration  for one of them, picked
     him  up. They  have picked  up and  relieved him and  then having
     learned  who  he is,  out  of  respect for  his  father, who  has
     rendered to  them assistance  at one time,  has allocated without
     the repayment to military quarters of Russians.

     In   structure   of  Caucasian   Musketeer  Regiment,   Bagration
     participated in  campaigns of  1783, 1784, 1785  and 1786, having
     shown himself as a brave and courageous soldier, prepared to bear
     all difficulties of military life.

     On experience  of severe  fights with enemies  he closely studied
     military business and gave  back it all forces. In 1788 Caucasian
     Musketeer   Regiment  was   directed  to  fortress   Ochakov,  to
     participate  in  dashing  actions  on mastering  by  this  strong
     Turkish stronghold.

     The commander-in-chief of the Russian army was Gregory Potyemkin,
     at  those  times, powerful  favorite  of  the Empress  Ekaterina.
     Alexander  Suwaroff, the  greatest Russian commander,  leaded the
     left wing  of the army.  Still prior to the  beginning battle, he
     has  offered  to  Potyemkin  the  courageous  plan  of  mastering
     fortress by a method of decisive storm. However
     commander-in-chief  has  rejected this  plan,  having ordered  to
     begin  a   gradual  siege   of  fortress.  Owing   to  the  large
     disagreements  with   Potyemkin  on  conducting  battle  actions,
     Suwaroff was  compelled to  leave from under  Ochakov. Only after
     some  months,  when the  siege  has not  given positive  results,
     Potyemkin  was convinced  of correctness  of the  Suwaroff's plan
     accepted it and has decided to storm Ochakov.

     On 6  December (17), 1788 Russians  attacked Ochakov and gained a
     complete victory.

     In  time of assault,  Bagration has  shown the large  bravery. He
     battled with a great  courage and was among the first, who rushed
     into a  fortress. After a capture  of Ochakov, Bagration has come
     back to Caucasus, where took part in a military campaign of 1790.

     Bagration served  in Caucasian Musketeer Regiment  till June 1792
     and consecutively  pass all steps of  a military service from the
     sergeant up to the captain.

     Since June 1792 till  May 1794 he served in Kiev Cavalry Regiment
     in grades of a second major and premier-major.

     On 4  May 1794 he was  transferred in Sofia Carabineers Regiment.
     He participated  in structure of this  regiment during the Polish
     campaign   of   1794,   which   was  headed   by   A.   Suwaroff.

     In fights and campaigns  1783-1794 Bagration has shown himself as
     a skilful  commander. His characteristic  features were exclusive
     calmness and  boundless bravery in fight,  speed and resoluteness
     of actions, skill to use the convenient moment for drawing impact
     on  an  enemy.  The  glory  about  courage  and  fearlessness  of
     Bagration  was widely  spread  among the  soldiers and  officers.

     A.  Suwaroff has  paid attention  to Bagration. He  cordially has
     grown  fond of  Bagration  and tenderly  refer to  him  - "Prince
     Peter" ("Knyaz  Peter") and did not  hide the special respect and
     trust to him.

     On  15  October  1794  Bagration  has  received a  grade  of  the
     lieutenant colonel.  In 1798 he was  already a colonel, commander
     of  the  6-th  Regiment,  and  on  next year  received  grade  of
     general-major  and has  taken  part in  famous Italian  and Swiss
     campaigns of  Russian army, with which  the extremely bright page
     of his military biography opens.

     During the Italian campaign  of 1799 the general-major Bagration,
     leading the avant guard of the Russian army, has taken by assault
     a citadel of Breshia  (April 10), attacked and has occupied Lecco
     and was  wounded by  a bullet in  a leg, but  continued fight and
     supervised over fight. On  April 16 the French army was broken by
     A. Suwaroff on the river Adda, the Milan was engaged, and on turn
     there was a ferry through the river Po.

     Bagration, who  headed the  avant guard, forwarded  through it on
     April  21 and  was  set to  Tortona.  On April  28 Bagration  has
     advanced to  a fortress Alessandria and  by this movement stopped
     direct communications of the French with Genoa.

     On  May  6, according  to  a disposition  of Suwaroff,  Bagration
     hastened to  St. Juliano, to make lateral  avant guard of army at
     flank  movement to  river Cesia.  Having heard shots  at Marengo,
     Bagration has  turned to support Austrians  and magnanimously has
     conceded  general  leadership  to  younger in  a  grade,  general
     Luiziany, then  attached to him from  both flanks and has carried
     away  the   allies  in   prompt  attack  with   drum-type  fight.

     When one of the French columns tried to bypass the right flank of
     the allies,  Bagration with 7th  Regiment and Cossacks has beaten
     off  impact. Attempt  of  the French  to break  in Genoa  has not
     managed.

     On June  6 in the  morning, news has come  that McDonald attacked
     Austrians  (general  Tott) on  Tidone.  Suwaroff immediately  has
     taken avant guard and together with Bagration hastened to a place
     of fight.

     At three  o'clock in the  afternoon he was already  there and has
     detained  the French  by  the valiant  cavalry attack  up  to the
     approach of  infantry. When  it (infantry) has  seemed, Bagration
     approached  to  Suwaroff  and,  probably  not  understanding  the
     importance  of minute,  in a  low voice  asked him to  delay with
     attack, before  the infantry will not  approach, since in some of
     battalions there  were less  than 40 men. Suwaroff  answered him:
     "But McDonald have not even 20 men, attack with the God! Hurrah!"

     Bagration  immediately obeyed  and have  struck on the  enemy and
     rejected  him  in the  large  disorder for  Tidone. McDonald  has
     collected the  army on  Tidone and made  a new attack  on Russian
     army on June 7,  during which Bagration was wounded. However, the
     second wound  of Bagration  in this campaign has  not deduced him
     out of operation.

     On August 4 at Novi, Suwaroff has assigned Bagration to carry out
     a resolute  impact. Then  the legendary campaign  of Russian army
     through Alps  to Switzerland has followed.  Bagration went in the
     head  of the  army, first  took up  all impacts of  the opponent,
     first overcoming all barrier,  which were put by a wild nature of
     mountains; then  he led  the avant guard  constraining attacks of
     the  French; and  finally, when  at last  Russian armies  got out
     safely from  that entrapment, in which  they were placed not only
     by opponent,  but also by the  ally (Austrians), only 16 officers
     and 300  bottom grades were remained  in Bagration's Regiment. He
     was wounded for third time during this war in battle at Klyontal.

     After returning  in Russia  Bagration was appointed  the chief of
     Jager Regiment.

     With the  beginning of the war of  Russia with Napoleon, in 1805,
     Bagration was entrusted the avant guard of Russian army, but when
     the army  entered frontiers of Austria,  thanking to capitulation
     of  allied  Austrian  army  under Ulm,  the  40-thousand  Russian
     Regiment,  having  in  rear  Danube, encountered  several  French
     armies. Kutusoff  began hasty  deviation to Russian  borders, and
     the avant guard of  Bagration became a rear guard of the army and
     during 400 miles, by  a number of persistent fights (at Laymbakh,
     Amshteten  and Krems)  - constrained  the opponent and  has given
     Russian army  an opportunity to get out  of this trap. But hardly
     it has passed at Krems on the left coast of Danube, as Vienna has
     surrendered to Napoleon, and  last, in turn, passing over Danube,
     has rushed to Znaim  on a way of deviation of Kutusoff from Krems
     to Brunn, the capital of Moravia.

     This time  situation of  Russian army became  even more critical.
     And  second time  Bagration  rescued it.  Kutusoff's men  were so
     weary that they could proceed no farther without a rest, and from
     Schrattenthal  he sent  back Bagration,  to Hollabrunn,  with six
     thousand of the freshest  troops, to check the French advance and
     to detain  the French by all  means, even if for  this purpose it
     would be necessary to sacrifice all regiment.

     Believing the main army  of Kutusoff to be before him, Murat felt
     unable to  engage. Accordingly he dispatched  a messenger under a
     flag  of  truce with  the  statement,  purely fictitious,  though
     speciously based  on certain irrelevant  facts, that negotiations
     had been opened for  a general armistice. Kutusoff, pretending to
     be familiar  with the details of  the falsehood, heartily entered
     into a  proposition to  negotiate, using the time  thus gained to
     prepare his  further retreat. A paper  was duly drawn up, signed,
     and sent to Napoleon at Schonbrunn. The Emperor, seeing how Murat
     had been outwitted, immediately  sent off an adjutant to him with
     peremptory orders to attack at once. When this command arrived at
     Hollabrunn, Soult had come  in with three divisions, but Kutusoff
     with  his   army  was   far  away  on  the   highroad  to  Znaim.

     On November  4, near Hollabrunn, Bagration  has sustained furious
     assaults  of  two  French  armies  within  8 hours.  He  has  not
     abandoned a position even when Division of Legran has gone to his
     rear.

     When Bagration received news  that Kutusoff passed Znaim with the
     main  forces  and was  outside  of danger,  Bagration leaded  his
     Regiment and laid by  bayonets a way through a ring of the French
     armies and  burning settlements  of Hollabrunn and  Grund and has
     joined army.

     Napoleon had  by this time come up to  take charge in person, but
     it was too late:  Murat had "destroyed the fruits of a campaign."
     Near Brunn, Kutusoff met  the Vienna garrison, and at Wischau the
     united  force  of  forty-five   thousand  men  joined  the  first
     detachment, fourteen  thousand strong, of a  second Russian army,
     which was advancing under Buxhowden.

     For   this   brilliant   feat   Bagration   was   made   in   the
     general-lieutenant,  and  the 6-th  Jager  Regiment, first  among
     others in Russian army,  has received as an award silver trumpets
     with stripes of St. George.

     After  connection  of  Kutusoff  with the  column  of  Buxhowden,
     Bagration again  became on  the head of  avant guard. On  ways to
     Austerlitz, Bagration break the French at Wischau and Raustnitsa.

     On  December 2,  1805  on Austerlitz  field, the  avant  guard of
     Bagration has made extreme right flank of a battle arrangement of
     allied army  and when the columns of  its center were beaten, has
     undergone  severe assaults  of the  victorious opponent,  but has
     resisted  and   covered  deviation   of  the  broken   army.  For
     Austerlitz, Bagration  was awarded with order  of St. George of 2
     class.

     In  campaign 1806-1807  Bagration  again was  the chief  of avant
     guard or  rear guar of Russian army,  depending on the success of
     Russians.

     Thus,  with continuous  within 3  days battle,  Bagration covered
     deviation of Russian army  from Jashma to Preussisch-Eylau during
     70  miles, and took  part in  battle at Preussisch-Eylau  (26 and
     January 27), on 27-th  he supervised over actions not only of his
     guard, but also of Dokhturov's Regiment, who was wounded and left
     out of operation.

     Having  received  an  order  of  the  commander-in-chief  general
     Benningsen, to  beat out the French  from Preussisch-Eylau by all
     means, Bagration, having hastened, with a banner in a hand leaded
     an   assault   and    took   into   possession   that   location.

     However  Russian army  nevertheless  was compelled  to recede  to
     Konigsberg  and   this  movement  was  made   under  covering  of
     Bagration's group. As Napoleon, not having developed the success,
     also  has  departed  for   Paarga,  Benningsen  again  passes  in
     approach.   Bagration,  mastering   the  avant   guard,  occupied
     Gulshtadt  and, continuing  a march  further, attacked on  May 24
     enemy at  Altkirkhen, forced down them  after six-hour fight with
     rather favorable positions, pursued  and completed a victory by a
     new defeat the next day at village Ankerdorf.

     Attacked  on   May  28  by  the   opponent's  cavarly,  Bagration
     persistently defended at Gutshtadt,  then detained a ferry of the
     French through  Alle and gave to  Russian army time to strengthen
     positions at Gelsberg.

     Then Bagration has covered the withdrawal of Russian army as well
     as  its deviation  to  Bartenshtein, remaining  in Gelsberg  till
     morning of May 31.

     In battle at Fridland  the group of Bagration was deployed on the
     left flank of an arrangement of Russian army.

     When Russians have not sustained and in frustration have begun to
     recede,  Bagration  with  a sword  in  hands  began to  encourage
     soldiers  of the  Moscow  Grenadier Regiments,  which rests  have
     surrounded his horse, reminding the soldiers their feats in Italy
     with Suwaroff . . . But all was vain.

     For 16  hours has stayed Bagration in  this severe fight and then
     for  5 day  constrained of  the opponent pursuing  Russian broken
     army, gone to Tilsit.

     For  the battle at  Fridland, Bagration  was awarded with  a gold
     sword decorated  with diamonds, with an  inscription "For brave".

     Despite  of an  extreme  pressure of  the forces  during campaign
     1805-1807 Bagration  has accepted  appointment on theatre  of war
     with  Sweden  (1808-1809)  and  become  the  Hero  of  this  war.

     Nominated as a commander of 21st Infantry Regiment, he has broken
     in night  with 15  on February 16  of the general  Adlerkreits at
     Artchio,  28-th -  has occupied  Tamerfor, on  March 4 has  put a
     defeat  to  the  Swedish   commander  -in-chief  to  the  general
     Klingspor at Biernerborg and,  pursuing him within 8 days for 200
     miles on disgusting roads, has occupied on 10 of March Abo, on 12
     -  Khristianshtadt, 26 th -  Vase, on  March 31 -  Aland islands.

     Disease  caused  by  the  amplified continuous  works,  compelled
     Bagration to leave temporarily  army. Having restored the forces,
     he has returned to Finland in the autumn of 1808 and on September
     16  defeated   generals  Boye  and   Lanshtisgauzen  at  Gelsing.

     To put  to the Swedes resolute  impact, the emperor Alexander has
     made  the plan  of a  winter campaign  of Russian  army on  ice a
     Botnic gulf  to Stockholm.  Not only majority of  the generals in
     army, but  also commanders-in-chief spoke  against such operation
     and  hesitated  with  the  beginning.  And  only  Bagration,  not
     reasoning in  essence, has answered the  count Arakcheev, sent by
     the Emperor to organize this campaign: "Let's order - shall go"'.

     Nominated by the chief  of one of three columns, Bagration should
     proceed from  Abo to Sweden through  Aland islands. The last were
     engaged  within  6 day,  and  the  avant guard  under Kulnev  has
     reached the Swedish coast and grasped Grisselgam in vicinities of
     Stockholm.

     In  the beginning  of August  1809 Bagration  was nominated  as a
     commander   of  the   Moldavian   army  acting   against  Turkey.

     The  historian of epoch  of the end  18th  and beginning 19 th E.
     Shumigorsky  believes  that   such  fast  moving  Bagration  from
     Finland, where  the war was already  terminated, to Turkey, where
     it lasted without results for third year, was, in effect, for him
     (Bagration)   the  honourable   disgrace.  The  Royal   Court  in
     St.-Petersburg did  not wish more  to see him in  capital, due to
     intimate issues.

     Of  average  growth,  thin,  brawny  brunette  with  the  typical
     Georgian  hooked  nose,  that   gave  occasion  to  a  number  of
     witticisms and  jokes (Once, Denis  Davidov came to Bagration and
     told him  that an enemy is very close  - already "on their nose".
     Bagration  calmly replied  -  "on whose  nose? If  mine,  we have
     enough time  to have a breakfast. If yours,  we have to hurry!"),
     Bagration was ill-looking, but all figure made strong impression:
     the soldiers called him "the Eagle". But the glory and reputation
     of Suwaroff's disciple made stronger impression.

     On  this ground,  probably, there  was devotion  by him  of great
     princess Ekaterina  Pavlovna, who was at  the age of 18-20 years.
     To  put the  end,  great princess  was give  out in  marriage for
     Prince George  of Oldenburg  in April 1809. But  as Bagration did
     not  want to  reconcile  to this  fact,  he was  promoted to  the
     General of Infantry and directed to Moldavia.

     Having arrived  here, Bagration carried out  the military actions
     with  usual  speed  and  resoluteness.  Having in  army  only  20
     thousand  man, he,  not  removing blockade  Ismail, has  taken on
     August 18 Machin, on 22 - Fursov, on 29th - Kustenji., on the 4th
     of  September,  defeated  at  the Rossevat  the  perfect  turkish
     armies, the  on 11 - has besieged Silistria, on  14th - has taken
     Ismail, and on 27th - Brailov.

     Great  Vezir  with  armies equal  to  force  Russian troops,  has
     hurried  to  Silistria. Bagration  has  met and  defeated him  on
     October 10 at Tataritsa.

     But when  it became known,  that other armies of  the great Vezir
     rushed to  Silistria, Bagration  has decided to  remove the siege
     and on  October 14 has allocated the armies  on the left coast of
     Danube,  intending to  renew military  actions in the  spring and
     with more significant forces.

     But the Royal Court in St.-Petersburg remained very dissatisfied,
     and  in March,  1810, Count  H. Kamensky  was sent  to substitute
     Bagration.

     Awarded for turkish war  by an order of St. Andrew, Bagration was
     appointed as  a the  commander-in-chief of the 2 nd Western Army.



                              Peter Bagration
                  Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (I)

                                             "There are no good
                                             generals  In  Russia.  The
                                             exception makes
                                             Bagration"
                                                        Napoleon, 1812.

                                             "Bagration  is  a Lion  of
                                             the Russian Army"
                                                          I. Chernishev

                                 Chapter II

     Napoleon used  infringement by Russia of  conditions Tilzit peace
     agreement as  a pretext  for the begining  of war. He  aspired to
     isolate  Russia  and  to   use  in  war  against  her  all  basic
     West-European  states.  Governments  of  these states,  trembling
     before Napoleon, have started  obediently to deploy armies. On 12
     February, 1812  the king of Prussia  has signed with Napoleon the
     agreement about  joint actions against Russia  and has undertaken
     to expose  the 20-thousand  Regiment with 60 canons,  and also to
     provide the  French army with the  foodstuffs during its progress
     through Prussian  territory. On 2 March,  1812 the similar treaty
     with Austria  was made.  The Austrian emperor  promised to expose
     the 30-thousand  army with  60 pieces of  artillery. Only Sweden,
     having incurred heavy casualties in war 1808-1809, did not go for
     Napoleon and has concluded on March 24, 1812 the allied agreement
     with Russia.

     Also, unsuccessful was Napoleon's attempt to ally with Turkey. As
     a result  of a rout by Russian army  under command of M. Kutusoff
     of Turkish army in  1811, the Turkish government was compelled to
     sign on  16 May,  1812 the Bucharest  Peace Treaty, one  of which
     conditions  was the  obligation of  Turkey to keep  neutrality in
     case of war between Russia and France.

     Despite of these two  failures, Napoleon nevertheless has managed
     to  form an  extensive coalition,  led by France,  that possessed
     huge material resources.

     Simultaneously  with   diplomatic  preparation  the  strengthened
     preparation  of necessary  forces and  means was  developed. This
     preparation was  carried out in unusual  before that time scales.
     "Never till  now, I  did not do  of so extensive  preparations" -
     declared Napoleon.

     By continuous mobilization in  France and among the population of
     other states, under French dominion, Napoleon has put under a gun
     1200  thousand  men,  from which  600  thousand  were inside  the
     country and  600 thousand with 1372  pices of artillery have made
     the  so-called "Great  Army" and  intend for war  against Russia.

     The army of Napoleon  differed by the large variety of the parts,
     entering  into  her.  Besides  actually  the  French  armies,  it
     included armies almost of  all nationalities of then Europe: from
     Italy, Austria, Prussia,  Bavaria, Westphalia, Saxony, Poland and
     others.

     The significant  part of  the foreigners serving  in "Grand army"
     was violently recruited and was hostilely concerned to the future
     actions.  These circumstances  as  well as  many others,  did not
     promote maintenance  in army a discipline  and high moral spirit.
     Nevertheless  it had  good battle  training, had  skilled command
     structure,   still   trusted  in   authority   of  Napoleon   and
     consequently, despite of  lacks, represented very puissant force.

     The large attention was given to preparation of rear and material
     maintenance of armies. In  fortresses on r. Visla the huge stocks
     of  the   foodstuffs  concentrated  and  the   warehouses  of  an
     ammunition were  created, the hospitals were  developed, the road
     network was improved.

     Extensive preparations  of the  French government to  war against
     Russia,   required  from   the  Russian  Royal   Court  immediate
     performing of  effective measures  on organization of  a reliable
     defense of the state.

     However the  Royal Court,  knowing about approaching  danger, has
     failed  to  prepare properly  the  country for  repulse of  enemy
     invasion.

     First of all imperial  government has appeared powerless to draft
     the  concrete  plan  of  wars under  the  certain  circumstances.

     On the  eve of war on the part of a  number of military plans and
     drafts  concerning possible  character of actions  against France
     were submitted to government.

     The  preference was  given up  to the  plan made by  the military
     adviser  of  Czar  Alexander  I, general  Full,  former  Prussian
     officer.

     Recognizing that the frontier strip of Russia was divided by bogs
     of Polesye  on two  parts - northern and  southern, Full supposed
     probable approach  of the napoleonic army  only on one direction:
     either to  the north from Polesye or to the  south of it. In this
     connection he offered to generate two armies and to arrange first
     In northern  part of a frontier strip,  and second - in southern.
     In case  of approach of  the opponent to the  north from Polesye,
     the  first  army  should  recede  to  empowered  camp,  that  was
     necessary to  put up at Dryss on Western  Dvina, and to hold down
     there coming armies of  the opponent. In the meantime second army
     should act on enemy's  flank and rear. If the opponent has passed
     in  approach  to the  south  from  Polesye, the  second army  was
     obliged to  recede to Jitomyr and  Kyiv, and the first  army - to
     act  on   rears  and  communications  of   the  coming  opponent.

     This plan was vicious in the basis. It does not take into account
     an  opportunity of  conducting  by the  opponent of  simultaneous
     approach on  both specified  directions. And it is  at the moment
     when  against Russia  approached Napoleon  himself, who  was wage
     triumphant   war  with   all   Europe  for   15  years   already.

     Besides division, provided by this plan, of Russian army into two
     groups,  isolated  one  from  another  by  un-passable  strip  of
     Polesye, created  favorable conditions  for the opponent  to rout
     them in parts.

     Nevertheless  Alexander,  blindly trusting  in  authority of  the
     adviser,  has accepted  the plan  and has  put it  in a  basis of
     waging of war with France. According to this plan to the north of
     Polesye, in area of Vilno, the 1st Western army was deployed, and
     to  the south from  Polesye, in area  of Lunk  - the 2 nd Western
     army.

     On  Western  Dvina  at Dryssa,  the  urgent  construction of  the
     so-called "Camp of Dryss" began.

     In the spring of 1812 the imperial government has made attempt to
     improve strategic  expansion of Russian army  by rapprochement of
     1st  and 2 nd Western armies.  With this purpose the  2nd Western
     army  was re-located  to north  from Polesye,  at first,  in area
     Pruzhan,  and then  - Wolkovisk. In  area Lunk,  on a place  of a
     former  arrangement of  2nd  Western army,  3rd Western  army was
     convened.

     However this  measure has not resulted  in radical improvement of
     strategic expansion of Russian army. Even after this actions, the
     military forces  of Russia,  located on western  border, remained
     stretched and shattered.

     Directly  ahead of  beginning of  military actions  the strategic
     expansion of military forces  of Russia on western border was the
     following:

     The  1st  Western army  in structure of  1, 2,  3, 4, 5  and 6-th
     infantry, 1 st and 2nd cavarly and one  corpus of Cossacs, with a
     total number  of 127 thousand  men at 558 canons  settled down at
     the front of 180 kms from Rossyena up to Lyda, having put forward
     a Cossac corpus in area of Grodno.

     The 2nd Western army in structure of 7-th and 8-th infantry, 4-th
     cavalry  and  nine  Cossack  corps, with  a  total  number of  36
     thousand  men  at  180  canons (not  considering  27-th  infantry
     division, included in structure,  on 9 May, 1812 and taking place
     in ways from Moscow) settled down at the front of 100 kms in area
     Wolkovysk,    having     Cossacks    deployed    along    border.

     The 3rd Western  army with an aggregate number in 43 thousand men
     with 165 canons was located in area Lunk.

     The break between 1st and 2nd Western armies reaches 100 kms, and
     between 2nd and 3rd armies - 200 kms.

     The  total  number  of military  forces  of  Russia resisting  on
     western border  to army  of Napoleon, made 210  thousand men with
     903 canons.

     The government  has not created a  single commander headquarters.
     In case of separated  forces, it strongly complicated interaction
     of armies.

     The   construction   of   defensive   structures  was   developed
     unsufficiently. In frontier areas the repair and strengthening of
     fortresses  began, as  well as  construction of  a number  of new
     fortresses and bastions.

     However all these works  were carried extremely slowly and to the
     beginning of military actions  were not finished. Organization of
     material maintenance of armies was in a poor condition. Although,
     in  many places,  especially along  the rivers of  Western Dvina,
     Berezina and Dnepr, food warehouses were built.

     Thus,  to  the  moment  of  intrusion  of  napoleonic  army,  the
     situation in  Russia and its armed  forces was quite unclear. The
     opponent had the  overwhelming numerical superiority. The Russian
     armies  were  developed   unsuccessfully,  they  had  not  single
     commander-in-chief   and    real   plan    of   conducting   war.

     Napoleon,  having  huge forces  and  means,  intended to  destroy
     Russian army  in a frontier strip and  then, by fast promotion of
     the armies, to take possession of Moscow and to dictate of Russia
     of a condition of armistice.

     Napoleon has  expressed strategic importance  of possesing Moscow
     by the  following words: "If  I occupy Kyiv, I  shall take Russia
     for  legs; if  I acquire St.  Petersburg, I  shall take it  for a
     head; having occuping Moscow,  I shall spear Russia in its heart"

     According to  this plan in the  beginning of June, 1812. Napoleon
     has deployed  the army near Visla on  a line Warsaw - Konisgberg,
     in   three   groups:  the   left   wing,   centre,  right   wing.

     The left wing in  structure of 1st, 2nd and 3rd infantry, 1st and
     2nd cavalry corps and French guards by an aggregate number in 220
     thousand  men  with 527  canons,  was  under Napoleon's  command.

     The central  group under command of  the vice-roy of Italy Eugene
     de Beauharnais  consisted of  4th and  6th infantry,  3rd Cavarly
     corps and Italian Royal  Guards by a total number of 85 thousands
     men with 208 canons.

     The  right wing  in structure  5th , 7 th and  8th infantry,  4th
     cavalry corps  with a  total number of  75 thousand men  with 166
     canons  was  under  leadership  of Napoleon's  brother  -  Jerome
     Bonaparte.

     The left  flank of Napoleon's army  was provided with 30-thousand
     prussian  corps  of Marshal  McDonald,  and  right -  35-thousand
     Austrians of general Swartsemberg.

     Besides Napoleon had large reserves (160 thousand men), that were
     deployed in Prussia.

     The main  impact should be rendered to the  left wing with a task
     to cross Neman, defeat  the 1st Western army of Russians and take
     in possession Vilno.

     Central  group of  corps was  necessary to  supprot left  wing in
     performance of the task.

     The  task of  right wing  corps was  to hold  down armies of  2nd
     Western army to prevent  its movement to north on connection with
     1 st Western  army and by  that to  enable left wing  and central
     corps  to destroy  1 st Western  army and  to take  in possession
     Vilno.

     In  further army  of the  right wing  was supposed to  share with
     other  forces  in  resolute actions  against  2 nd Western  army.

     In night for 12 June, 1812 the left wing of the French army begun
     a ferry through Neman  at Kovko (nowadays Kaunas). The War began.

     After  resignation  of  a   post  of  the  commander-in-chief  of
     Moldavian army,  Bagration was  not at businesses  for some time.
     Only on  7 August, 1811 the  imperial decree about his assignment
     as  commander-in-chief of  Podolsk  army (which  settled down  on
     Ukraine  in Kiev,  Volynsk and  Podolsk provinces)  has followed.

     In the beginning of September, 1811 Bagration arrivied to Podolsk
     army, and by spring  of 1812 was authorized to hold a post of the
     commander-in-chief  of 2 nd Western  army, that generated  on the
     basis of Podolsk army. The new army at first settled down in Lupk
     area, and then was relocated to Volkovysk area.

     This  army  covered  major  western strategic  direction  and  it
     assigned on Bagration responsiblilty to defend borders of Russia.

     Facing  to   the  extensive  military   preparations  of  France,
     Bagration showed  a large concern for  destiny of the native land
     and took concrete measures  in interests of maintenance of safety
     of the country.

     One of steps in  this direction was the development by him of the
     plan of campaign 1812, which was stated in special report to czar
     Alexander.

     Characterizing  the situation  that has  been occured  in Europe,
     Bagration marked,  that in the unlimited  aspiration to a gain of
     world  domination Napoleon  took over  many European  peoples and
     that the  real threat  to undergo the  ssame fate has  hung above
     Russia. " He (Napoleon)  is waiting for an  appropriate minute to
     set  up an  ardent banner  on limits  of your  empire !"  - wrote
     Bagration to Alexander.

     Considering  war inevitable,  Bagration recommended  Alexander to
     accept urgent  measures for  the safety of Russia  and to protect
     the country  from a sudden attack of  an enemy. In these purposes
     he  offered to  direct immediately  to the French  government the
     Note, in which, on the one hand, to state about means accepted by
     Russian government  for maintenance  of the world  between Russia
     and  France, and  on  the other  hand to  specify all  actions of
     Napoleon   directed  against   peaceful  intentions   of  Russia.

     Having  confirmed  readiness  of  Russian  government  to  aspire
     henceforth to preservation and strengthening of relations between
     both states,  the Note should also  made to the French government
     an offer  on an  establishment border line  on Oder river  or any
     other boundary. Through this  boundary napoleonic army should not
     pass.  The transition  of this  boundary by  armies, even  by one
     battalion, should be considered  by Russia as the announcement of
     war.

     To  opinion of  Bagration,  establishment of  a such  border line
     could serve a sufficient  guarantee ensuring Russia from a sudden
     attack  of an  enemy. Simultaneously  with departure of  the Note
     Bagration  advised  to  carry   out  the  following  measures  on
     preparation of Russian armies:

       1. To strengthen the armies, located on western border, having
          developed them in two groups: one in area Belostoc by number
          in 100 thousand man with enough of artillery, and another in
          Baltic area in structure not less to than five divisions,
          having supplied it not only field, but also, as far as it is
          possible, by siege artillery, completely supplied with an
          ammunition;
       2. To arrange spare armies by number in 50 thousand man in the
          second line, on distance of 1OO-150 miles from these armies
          making the main army. This group was necessary for using
          depending on conditions;
       3. To found beforehand warehouses for uninterrupted maintenance
          of armies by the foodstuffs They would contain not less than
          annual stock of the foodstuffs and fodder on 250-thousand
          army, and also to prepare vehicles for transportation of a
          monthly stock of the foodstuffs and fodder on 150-thousand
          army;
       4. To result in battle readiness the Baltic fleet. Bagration
          considered as most probable, that Napoleon in interests of a
          prize of necessary time for expansion of the army will
          hesitate with the answer to the specified Note and "not
          looking on anything" throw armies through offered to him
          border line. In this case Bagration offered to put forward
          to Visla an army located at Belostoc and to occupy Warsaw.
          The armies, located in Baltic area on border with East
          Prussia, must be put forward to Graudents on the same day
          and with the same speed, then proceed to Visla and with an
          assistance of the Baltic fleet to take possession of Gdansk
          After the first line it was necessary to move also armies of
          the second line. The further plans of military actions were
          provided to be defined depending on actions of the opponent.

     "... Main...advantage of such  sudden and speed movement, adviced
     by me,  -  wrote Bagration,  - is, that  the theatre  of war will
     leave from  limits of empire and that we  shall be in a condition
     to occupy on Visla  such a position that would provide us with an
     opportunity to  act against opponent with a  great courage. . . "

     Bagration  well understood,  that future  war will be  waged with
     large pressure from both parties, and consequently recommended to
     create beforehand reliable reserves to supply the main forces. He
     offered to arrange the third line, on a distance of 100-150 miles
     from spare armies, in a structure of recruits, trained in special
     depots, and besides to recruit more soldiers.

     These are the basic features of the plan of campaign 1812 drafted
     by Bagration. The analysis  of this plan testifies about deep and
     correct  estimation  of Bagration  of  conditions on  the eve  of
     intrusion  of  napoleonic army.  The  measures,  planned by  him,
     carried  active  character and  provided  reliable protection  of
     Russia against a sudden attack of an enemy. The large interest is
     represented by the basic idea of the Bagration's plan - . . . . .
     . of the opponent in drawing the first impact.

     Bagration's plan,  as well  as valuable suggestion  of many other
     military figures on a  question of conducting war against France,
     was not accepted by imperial government. At the same time it does
     not inform Bagration neither about the general plan (Full's plan)
     of conducting war, nor  about a concrete task, which was assigned
     on 2-nd Western army.

     Concerned by  such situation Bagration has  requested on 17 April
     1812 from the minister  of war. Barclay de Tolly the general plan
     of military actions.

     "I  believe,  -  wrote  Bagration,  - that  before  beginning  of
     military  actions  I  shall  receive  on this  account  the  most
     detailed remarks from Your  Excellency, for you are more aware of
     the political  businesses and  items, on which  an opponent shall
     throw the forces"

     However the answer has  not followed. Only on 3 June, that is for
     9 days prior to the beginning of war, the headquarters of the 2nd
     Western  army received  three  instructions of  Barclay de  Tolly
     dated 1  June, in  which on behalf  of Czar Alexander,  the first
     instructions  on   character  of  future  actions   and  task  of
     Bagration's army were given.

     According  to them  the  task of  2 Western  army was  reduced to
     conducting  defensive actions.  It  was offered  to abstain  from
     offensive actions. "When  it will be decided conudct offensively,
     then Your . . . . will be informed, in appropriate time about the
     general  plan of  operations, but  before its reception  you must
     conduct defensive operations"

     In  case of  transition  in approach  of superior  forces  of the
     opponent, it was necessary  for the 2nd Western army to recede at
     first  to river Sharu,  and then  to Novogrudoc and  river Neman,
     where  it should  receive the  further instructions  either about
     continuation  of  deviation through  Minsk  to  Borisov or  about
     movement  on north  in the  shortest way  to incorporate  to 1-st
     Western army.

     Bagration was offered to familiarize with a condition of Bobruisk
     and  Borisov  and  to  begin  immediately  strengthening  Nesvij.

     Besides   he  was   ordered   to  establish   communication  with
     general-lieutenant Eytel's corps, which  in structure of 18 spare
     battalions, 16 squadrons and two Cosscaks regiments was formed at
     Mozyr to defend Pripyat, and also with 3rd Western army, Platov's
     corps  and armies  of  the left  wing of  the  1st  Western army.

     Carrying  out the  received instructions  Bagration has  sent the
     staff officers for recognition of road Volkovysc-Zelva-Slonim and
     ferries  through  river  Shara  from  its  mouth  up  to  Bitten.

     To the military engineer  the general-major Ferster was entrusted
     to examine  Nesvij and to present  opinions about measures on its
     strengthening, also to survey  a fortress of Bobruisk and redoubt
     at Borysov,  to make recognition of  roads from Nesvij to Borysov
     and Bobruisk, and also between these two items.

     The  communication  with  the  commander  of  the  reserve  corps
     general-lieutenant Eytel was established and found out the number
     of   corps,   their)   arrangement,   and   accommodation   area.

     Having begun  to perform received instructions,  Bagration at the
     same time  has addressed on June  6 to Alexander I  the letter in
     which  has  stated  the  reasons  of  an  estimation  of  present
     conditions and outlined plan of actions.

     Having stipulated, that, not being entered in circle of political
     questions, he  will speak only about  subjects that are known for
     him on the basis of battle experience, Bagration has subjected to
     sharp criticism strategic expansion  of Russian army, marking the
     following its main defects:

       1. Russian armies were deployed on the much stretched front and
          in case of intention of the opponent to put strong impact on
          one of them it was impossible to support it.
       2. Russian armies were located too close to border and they had
          not time to concentrate for repulse the opponent, if last
          approach by superior forces on any one direction.
       3. An unsuccessful expansion of Russian armies allowed the
          opponent to prevent their connection.

     Sharply   criticizing  strategic   expansion  of   Russian  army,
     Bagration resolutely has condemned also outlined plan of actions.
     Thus   he    especially   emphasized   the   extremely   negative
     consequences,  which will  be  caused in  armies by  a deviation.

     To avoid it, Bagration  again has confirmed the idea on necessity
     to  not  wait  for  an attack  of  an  enemy,  and  to break  its
     intentions by conducting on actions.

     "... Much more useful would be, without waiting for an attack, to
     fight in its borders" - specified Bagration.

     After this letter, on 8 June, Bagration has directed to Alexander
     I another  letter, in which, again  marking negative consequences
     of  deviation,  insisted on  necessity  of drawing  of the  first
     impact on an enemy.

     "Order  to us  to  assemble at  Grodno and  attack enemy  - wrote
     Bagration -  Any deviation  encourages rival and  gives him great
     ways in this territory,  and takes away our spirit... What are we
     afraiding  of  and  why  we  have  to  exhaust  army .  .  .  ?".

     On 11 June Bagration  received Barclay de Tolly's answer. Barclay
     informed Bagration,  that given  to him instruction on  a case of
     deviation, does not mean  refusal from offensive actions and that
     he   will   receive   additional   instructions  in   due   time.

     However,  the military  minister wrote,  the care requires  to be
     prepared  to deviation,  that  Russian armies  have not  appeared
     compelled to be involved  in resolute battle with superior forces
     of an enemy in unprofitable conditions.

     Bagration was  informed also, that the  order to provide the left
     flank of 2nd  Western army was sent to the commander -in-chief of
     3rd Western army general Tormasov.

     Thus,  in  the  Barclay  de  Tolly's letter  did  not  answeredon
     Bagration's major  questions connected  to unsuccessful expansion
     of  Russian armies  and  passive character  of strategy.  Also it
     followed from  the letter, that the  supreme command was going to
     support further Full's plan. As for the statement of the military
     minister  concerning an  opportunity  of transition  to offensive
     actions,  obviously,  it  was  purpose only  to  calm  Bagration.

     It  is  quite clear,  that  Barclay  de Tolly's  reply could  not
     satisfy  Bagration. On  12  June he  again sent  a letter  to the
     military  minister, asking  to  report to  Alexander I  about the
     situation of 2nd  Western army, and also about necessity to carry
     out urgent measures on  maintenance of Russian armies from sudden
     impact  of  an  enemy.   Bagration  again  marked  the  stretched
     disposition of 2nd Western army, which, having only two corps and
     unsufficient number of cavalry, was compelled to occupy a hundred
     miles. In  this situation, reported Bagration,  the army will not
     have  an opportunity to  prevent intentions  of rival in  case of
     intrusion at Grodno and Belostoc.

     Besides Bagration  paid attention to the  large break between 2nd
     and 3 rd Western armies.  To liquidate this break,  he offered to
     pull together  3rd Western army  to 2nd,  by concenrating the 3rd
     army  at   Kovel,  and   to  put  its  right   flank  to  Kobryn.

     "In  that  ratio of  the  third  army with  the  second  -  wrote
     Bagration - we shall  find itself in ways to repulse opponent, as
     in opposite  very much  divided for loss  mutual assisstance from
     one to another"

     At   last,  Bagration   marked,  that   2 nd  reserve   corps  of
     general-lieutenant  Ertel, located  at Mozyr,  was too  remote to
     render assisstance to the 2nd Army.

     On Bagration's  accounts, for forwarding of  this corp to 2 nd or
     3rd Armies, it would be required not less than 10 days. Therefore
     he offered to approach  the corp to armies of both armies, having
     arranged it at Pynsk.

     Fairly specifying on expansion of Russian army, Bagration rightly
     foresaw  also  possible way  of  actions of  the opponent.  Under
     present situation),  in his  opinion, the best way  of actions of
     the   opponent  will   be   rout  of   Russian  army   by  parts.

     "His indispensable benefit is to divide our forces, and he, in my
     opinion, will try to  take advantage of it" - informed Bagration.

     On 13 June the  instruction of Barclay de Tolly, dated on 12 June
     about  change   of  a  task  of   2  Western  army  has  arrived.

     The instruction  stated, that in connection  with accumulation of
     enemy forces  between Kovno and Meretsh  and a ferry, expected on
     12  June of  the  opponent through  Neman, the  Cossacks  corp of
     Platov was  ordered to act from area of  Grodno in flank and rear
     of  the opponent.  2nd  Western army  should assisst  Cossacks in
     performance of this task by protecting its rear. At the same time
     Borysov was  specified as a point where it  was necessary for the
     2 nd  Western  army   to  recede.  Further  instruction  informed
     Bagration, that  if 1st Western army will  not manage to give the
     opponent  battle  Vilno, it  will  be  concentrated at  Swentsyan
     where, can be, the battle will be given.

     On  14 June Bagration  has received  one more instruction  of the
     military  minister,  in which,  informing  about a  ferry of  the
     French  army  through  Neman  at  Kovno and  about  intention  to
     concentrate  the 1 st  Western army  at Vilno,  Barclay  de Tolly
     confirmed a  task of 2 Western army  stated in the instruction of
     12 June.

     The  new instructions of  Barclay de  Tolly did not  facilitate a
     situation of 2nd  Western army, and on the contrary, considerably
     complicated it. The army of Bagration was ordered to act in flank
     and rear  of the opponent, but was  not specified neither time of
     transition in approach, nor  direction, in which it was necessary
     to  go. Also. in  the instructions  nothing was spoken  about the
     purpose,   which   was    pursued   by   the   planned   actions.

     Besides the  opponent, who  has concentrated against  2nd Western
     army was not considered and, at last, the instructions of Barclay
     de  Tolly, putting  a new  order, did  not cancel  previous order
     about deviation to Borysov.

     Upon reception  of the  first instruction, on  13 June, Bagration
     was directed to the military minister the report, in which marked
     insufficiency of  forces of  2nd Western army  for performance of
     the order. Simultaneously  Bagration resolutely has condemned the
     assumption  to  concentrate  1  st  Western  army  at  Vilno.  He
     considered, that  in case of realization  of this assumption, 2nd
     Western army  will appear under threat of  being cut off not only
     from  1-st Western  army, but  also from  the line  of deviation.

     "One  correct review of  a map,  proves, that after  deviation of
     1-st army  to Swentsyan, a rival,  having occupiedVilno, can warn
     deviation of  2nd army to  Minsk and on brevity  of a way will be
     there  before I  shall  reach there  receding" -  was  written by
     Bagration.

     Besides  Bagration considered  that  realization of  the intended
     actions would  result in break  of communication between 2 nd and
     3rd  Western armies, and also in  exception of any opportunity of
     their connection.

     The  next  day,  after   reception  of  the  second  instruction,
     Bagration sent a new  report, in which again has emphasized, that
     the task,  put before the 2 nd Western army, was  unreal and that
     the  attempt  of  performance  will  create  extremely  difficult
     conditions  for  connection  of  armies. Informing  his  opinion,
     Bagration  asked the  sanction to  allocate 2 nd Western  army on
     Shara river, and to recede up to Minsk.

     Getting  decision  about   deviation  to  Minsk,  Bagration  well
     understood, what  a huge importance in  present conditions had an
     organization  of interaction of  armies of  2nd Western  army and
     cossacks. Therefore he has  sent to platov on 14 June the letter,
     in  which specified  the large  threat which  has hung above  2nd
     Western army  and Cossacks.  He wrote, that  the opponent, having
     occupied Vilno  on 16 or 17 June, can reach  Minsk by June 24 and
     thus  cut  off  ways  for  connection  with  1 st  Western  army.

     Bagration advised  Platov, in order  to not be cut  off from 1-st
     Western army, to follow with the corp on the right shore of Neman
     through  Lyda  on Minsk.  He  informed  Platov, that  in case  of
     movement of his corp in the specified direction, 2nd Western army
     will concentrate in Slonym  and will begin to recede Nesvyj under
     covering of  Cossacks corp of  general-major Ilovaysky. Bagration
     informed further, that after achievement of Nesvyj, Cossacks will
     be  directed to  north and,  maintained by  the main  forces, can
     together with  the Platov's corps render  impacts on opponent and
     at  the  same time  keep  communication with  1-st Western  army.

     In the letter Bagration wrote the following account of distances:
     "An opponent has 102 miles from Kovno up to Vilno, 200 miles from
     Vilno up to Minsk,  75 miles from Minsk up to Borysov, total 377.
     If  it  will take  from  Vilno a  way  on a  direct road,  rather
     convenient  for transition  of armies,  having left Minsk  on the
     right, then there are 321 miles up to Borysov; hence 18 less than
     mine path; since there  are 59 miles from Volkovysk up to Slepym,
     100 miles  from Slepym up to Nesvij, 105  miles from Nesvij up to
     Minsk,  75  miles from  Minsk  up  to Borysov.  total 339  miles"

     Having informed Platov this account of distances, Bagration tried
     to assure  him that the best direction  for movement not only for
     the 2nd army,  but also for Cossacks, was the direction on Minsk,
     as it gives the greatest opportunities to achieve connection with
     1st Western Army.

     In  another  letter, Bagration  told  Platov  about his  negative
     attitude to  idea of actions in  flank and rear of  the opponent.
     "To threaten in flank  and rear is impossible for you, since they
     have considerable forces  everywhere that means failures wherever
     you  appear..".  Bagration again  has  specified,  that the  most
     expedient way  of actions was the  deviation to Minsk.  "... If I
     shall not receive the  answer on my reports till tonight, I shall
     inform you about my deviation to Slonym Nesvyj and Minsk. That is
     all, that  I can  tell you. Better  to help ther 1 st army there,
     rather than to be divided and wander here".

     Platov has  agreed with  the Bagration's proposal. On  15 June he
     has informed it(him), that the parts of the case will follow from
     Grodno on  the right  coast Iaiaia, "having about  a direction on
     Minsk".

     The establishment of unity of sights between Bagration and Platov
     on character  of forthcoming actions has  played a positive role.
     It  has ensured  subsequently  organization of  close interaction
     between 2nd and  Cossacs has rescued them from inevitable rout in
     parts.

     Besides an establishment  of communication with Platov, Bagration
     has  undertaken a number  of measures  having the purpose  to not
     admi occupation  by the  opponent of Minsk. He  has ordered 27-th
     infantry division, that was moving from Moscow on connection with
     2nd  Western army, to stop  in Minsk and to  defend it in case of
     approach  of the opponent  from Vilno.  Also they were  given the
     instruction  to   put  forward  in  area   of  Minsk  12  reserve
     battalions, located in Bobruisk.

     Bagration expected for answer on his request for deviation of 2nd
     Western Army through Slonym, Nesvij to Minsk. At 20 pm on 16 June
     he has received the instruction from Barclay de Tolly on 15 June,
     in which  military minister informed, that  the order is given to
     Platov  to begin  deviation  through Lyda,  Smorgon to  Swentsam,
     acting  whenever  possible in  rear  and flank  of the  opponent.

     Bagration was  ordered to prevent cutting off  of the 2nd Western
     army  on a  road through  Minsk to  Borysov, and to  preserve the
     right wing of army against a sudden attack.

     The Instruction of Barclay de Tolly dated 15 June, as well as his
     instructions  received by  Bagration  earlier, did  not bring  in
     clearness to a task  of 2nd Western army, and main - did not give
     the answer to the  request of Bagration about deviation to Minsk.
     Considering  further stay  of  army in  area Volkovysk  extremely
     dangerous,  Bagration has  decided  to allocate  the army  in the
     specified  direction under  the  own initiative.  On 16  June the
     order on deviation was given up.

     In these  conditions the decision of  Bagration can be considered
     as the  best, as only fast  deviation of the 2nd  Western army to
     Minsk could  warn an  exit there of  enemy armies and  ensure the
     most favorable  conditions for  connection of 1-st  and 2 Western
     armies.

     As it  is visible from the  above mentioned documents, Bagratoion
     has not  at once come to this decision. On the  eve of war he was
     the supporter  of anticipatory  actions. Aspiring to  relieve the
     country of threat of  enemy invasion, he offered to put the first
     impacts on an enemy and by that to break all its plans. This idea
     Bagration very clearly has expressed in plan of campaign of 1812,
     and  also  in  representations  to military  minister  and  Czar.

     Bagration's  offers  were   quite  real  during  preparations  of
     Napoleon of war against Russia. However in the beginning of June,
     1812, when  the French army was  already made for drawing impact,
     and  Russian army  was not  prepared for  conducting anticipatory
     actions, these  offers did not correspond  any more to conditions
     and were erroneous.

     But it is necessary to blame for a mistake not Bagration, and the
     imperial government, which  did not inform the commander-in-chief
     by 2 Western army  on conditions. In his judgements Bagration was
     compelled  to consider  only  own information,  which, naturally,
     could not  reflect the  true situation that has  been occurred on
     all theatre of military actions.

     To  honour  of Bagration  it  is  necessary to  mantion, that  he
     managed in time to  refuse these sights. During the first days of
     war he has solved Napoleon's plan and in the report to Barclay de
     Tolly dated 14 June,  put a question not about offensive actions,
     but about the deviation of 2nd Western army with a task to remove
     it  from  under  threat  of  an surrounding  and  destruction  by
     superior forces  of the opponent and  by that to break  a plan of
     Napoleon.  Bagration   has  carried  out   this  task  perfectly.

     Unfortunately,  some  historians do  not  take  into account  the
     inscribed evolution in sights of Bagration and represent him as a
     commander, who during the Great Patriotic War of 1812 obstinately
     kept offensive tactics and  ostensibly did not want to hear about
     deviation.  Such sight  does not  correspond to the  validity and
     also  belittles  Bagration  as the  commander,  who  used in  the
     practice  such ways  of  actions that  perfectly corresponded  to
     those conditions.

     The  Deviation of  2nd Western  army began  on 17 June.  The army
     moved  in a direction  Zelva, Slonym,  being covered by  two rear
     guards-horse and infantry.

     Horse  rear guard,  consisting  from Akhtyrsk  Hussar, Lithuanian
     Uhlan and one Cossacks with horse-artillery, was under leadership
     ofi general-aide-de-camp Vasylchykov.

     Infantry  rear  guard was  composed  of  Grenadier Divsiionm  and
     horse-artillery under general-major Vorontsov.

     The  allocation of  two rear  guards was  caused by  necessity to
     ensure 2nd Army from possible impact of the enemy army from rear.

     For  the purpose  to  supply army  with the  foodstuffs  during a
     march,  every regiment  choosed a  group of  soldiers led  by the
     skilled officer.  These gropus,  following ahead of  the columns,
     during  rests, provided  the foodstuffs  at the expense  of local
     means   raised   by   requisitions.   Bagration  demanded,   that
     performance  of  the  specified  task  must  take  place  without
     violence  against  the   peace  inhabitants  and  their  robbery.

     The 2nd Western army had to accomplish a difficult task. They had
     to  overcome distance in  250 miles,  while the opponent  who has
     occupied  Vilno on  16 June,  was only  in 160 miles  from Minsk.
     Despite of  it, the specified task  was quite real, and Bagration
     was sure in its successful performance.

     "I calculated  marches in the  way, that on June  23 my apartment
     should  be in  Minsk, avant  guarde further, and  parties already
     nbear  Sventsyan" -wrote  Bagration to  A.P. Ermolov. It  was the
     exact and correct account.  It provided the most expedient way of
     connection of 1-st and 2nd Western armies.

     But the  well-organized deviation of 2 nd Western army was broken
     by intervention in actions of Bagration by Alexander. At 14 pm on
     18 June in Zelva the aide-de-camp of Czar, colonel Benkerdorf has
     handed  to  Bagration   Alexander's  order,  according  to  which
     direction  deviation  was   changed.  Bagration  was  ordered  to
     allocate army  near river Shara and to  set it on connection with
     the 1 st Western army through Novogrudok  or Belitsy in a general
     direction on Vileyko.

     Thus, 2nd Western  army should make difficult and dangerous flank
     march near  to the main forces of  enemy army, which already were
     ar this time at Vilno. The complexity of this flank movement was,
     that the  2nd armys had  to make 10 transitions  at a distance on
     4-5 transitions  from the  opponent. Besides Russian  armies were
     compelled to move in remote, marshy territory and to make a ferry
     through a large river  barrier - river Neman. All this inevitably
     would result  in a  delay of a  march, and the  army of Bagration
     could appear under impact of the main enemy forces from front and
     armies of Jerome Bonaparte - from rear.

     Obliged  to   obey  the  order  of   Czar,  Bagration  has  begun
     organization of  a march in a new direction.  First of all he had
     to choose  one of  two specified in Czar's  order directions. The
     way on Bileyko through  Belitsy was shorter and convenient but it
     passed  too close  from  Vilno, and  consequently, was  also more
     dangerous.

     Bagration  has  selected the  second  way  - through  Novogrudok.
     Though  this  way also  passed  on remote  and marshy  territory,
     distinguished by  a bad condition  of roads, but it  was far from
     Vilno  and  reduced probability  of  meeting  with the  opponent.
     Besides  at  movement through  Novogrudok,  which  was closer  to
     Minsk,  it  was easier  to  strengthen army  by connection  27-th
     infantry   division,   that   reached   at   this   time   Minsk.

     Having accepted the decision  on a direction of movement of army,
     Bagration has given back the following orders:

       a. to 27th infantry division - to concentrate in Novogrudok and
          to expect arrival there of main forces of 2 Western army;
       b. To the chief of the engineers - to send sappers to Neman
          with a task to make investigation of the river at Kryvichy,
          Nikolaev and Delyatichy and to construct by June 21 a ferry
          in the elected place;
       c. To make recognition of a way for movement of armies on
          Vishnev and Volojin.

     The order  about the  instruction of movement in  a new direction
     was given  that very day. Army  had to recede by  two echelons on
     distance about one transition  one from another, being covered by
     horse and infantry rear gueard. The special attention was paid on
     necessity  of  understanding  by  all personal  structure  of  an
     essence an  objective, for what Bagration  has ordered to explain
     all  details  to  the   sorldielrs  the  reason  and  purpose  of
     deviation.

     Moving in  a new direction, 2nd  Western army has concentrated at
     Slonym to the outcome  of June 19. On another day it has made the
     40-kilometer forced transition and  has reached Dvorets. With the
     purpose  of  acceleration  of a  march,  army  was released  from
     excessive cargoes.  All transports, not stipulated  by staff, was
     directed from  Dvorets to  Stvolytchy and Nesvij  for the further
     following on Minsk or Bobruisk.

     On June  21 the 2 nd Western army continued  movement and, having
     made again  the forced transition for  40 kilometers, has arrived
     in area Novogrudok. Its advanced parts have reached Delyatichy on
     Neman,  forwarded through  the river,  have entered  Nikolaev and
     Ivye, having put forward some groups to north. In Novogrudok 27th
     infantry division joined the army.

     March of  2nd  Western army from  Volkovysk up to  Novogrudok was
     accomplished  with an  extreme speed.  Starting on June,  17 from
     Volkovysk, the  army has reached Neman  in five transitions, that
     means it has passed  150 kilometers for 5 day. An Average rate of
     a march per day  was about 30 kilometers, but in last two day the
     army   promoted   with   speed   of  40   kilometers   per   day.

     After an  way out to Neman organization of  a ferry have begun at
     once. At  Nikolaev erection of a bridge  was began and the device
     of the ferry of army, and at Koledzan -construction of the bridge
     for a ferry of transports.

     In the meantime to the north from Nikolaev on ways of the further
     movement  of 2-nd  Western  army there  was menacing  conditions.

     On June,  16 the napoleonic army has  occupied Vilno. Russian 1st
     Western  army,   not  accepting  battle,   started  deviation  on
     direction to  Sventsyan and Dryss. It  meant, that calculation of
     Napoleon on  defeat of  Russian armies in area  Vilno has failed.
     Having convinced in impossibility  to crush 1st Western army in a
     frontier strip,  Napoleon has decided to  concentrate all efforts
     of the armies against  2nd Western army as it was provided by his
     plan. To  define a  direction of deviation of  2-nd Western army,
     Napoleon has put forward  on the major roads departing from Vilno
     on the  south and a southeast, strong  avant guardes. On June, 17
     one of  these avant guardes, moving to  the south from Vilno, has
     found out  at Bolshye  Solechniky Russian group  of general-major
     Dorokhov.  This  group  was  an  avant guarde  of  4-th  infantry
     division  of  the 1 st  Western army  and  moved from  Oran in  a
     northeast   direction  on   connection  with  the   main  forces.

     This very  day other avant guarde of the  French army acting to a
     southeast  from Vilno,  has  received data  on an  arrangement of
     Russian  armies  in area  Oshmjany.  These armies  were parts  of
     lateral guard  of the 3rd  cavarly corp of the  1-st Western army
     departing on to Olshan and Smorgon.

     On June, 18 at  Bolshye Solechniky there was a fight, as a result
     of  which Russians  have  rejected french  avant guard.  However,
     getting  informed that  enemy forces  were located to  the north,
     Dorokhov was  forced to direct  his group to Olshan.  He hoped to
     lay way  in this  direction and join  the main forces of  the 4th
     infantry corpus.

     Simultaneously,  near  Olshan, battle  between  the french  avant
     guarde  and flank  guard of  the 3 rd cavarly corpus  took place.
     Russians firmly  rejected all  the assauklts of  the considerably
     superior forces  of enemy, and thus  ensured deviation to Smorgon
     of the  main forces.  Succesfully achieving set  forth objective,
     they  went back  from  Oshmian folloing  the main  forces  of the
     coprpus on the night of 19 June.

     Having received reports cioncernung  the appearance of the Rusian
     forces on the ways to Lidu and Oshmian and battles, that had been
     fought at the Bolshix  solechnikov and Oshmian, Napoleon supposed
     that  these forces  were the part  of 2 nd Western Army  and that
     abovesaid armywas  moving from Grodno to  the north-east, to join
     the  1st  Western  Army. Based  on this  incorrect  assessment of
     situation, he  decided to make  a decisive assaut on  the army of
     Bagration and destroy it.

     With a view to  fullfill this objective accoriding to te roder of
     Napoleon, a  group of division was deployed,  being led by one of
     the most  talanted military commander of  the French Army Davout.
     This  detachment  was  composed of  2  infantry  and 1  curaisser
     divisions and 4 brigades  of light cavalry - totally 33, 864 men.

     Davout's forces began offensive on 19 June. This operation led to
     the ciurcumstances in which  russian forces deployed to the south
     and  south-eat from  Vilno, were  cut from  the main  routs, that
     allowed them to join  1st Western Army in a short period of time.
     First  of  all  this  refered  to  the  Cossacks  of  Platov  and
     Dorokhov's group.

     Dorokhov's group retreated from the Bolshie Colechniki to Olshan,
     and getting informed about  the forwarding of the enemy forces to
     the Oshmian,  gave up of the idea to join 1 st Qwestern army . He
     moved to join 2 nd western army by the road to Bishnev-Volojin on
     the night of 20 of June.

     Cossacks of Platov ,  having left Grodno on 16 of june, retreated
     to the eatern direction  and by 21 June reached the locateion the
     north from  Nikolaev. By the time  these events were taking lace,
     the  2nd  Western  Army was  preparing to  cross over  the Neman.
     According to  the Bagration's order, the  army was to concentrate
     on the  left shore of  the river by the  10 pm of 22  June and be
     ready to cross the river.

     With  the purpose  of  the further  clearing armies  of excessive
     transports,  soldiers  were  authorized  to take  only  the  most
     necessary vehicles (for wounded,  artillery, food) and besides in
     a  strictly  limited  quantity.  Generals  might  have  only  one
     carrier,  and commanders  of divisions  and corps, besides  - one
     vehicle under chancellory.

     All other transport, including  the private vehicles belonging to
     an officers,  was concentrated  at Korelichi, where  it should be
     divided into  two parts; it was planned that  one part of it will
     be forwarded  through Neman at Koledzani,  with a view of sending
     them further to Ivenec,  Rakov and Minks, while another part - to
     direct on the Mir and, Minsk.

     After  a  ferry, a  rest  for  armies of  2-nd  Western army  was
     predetermined, and with approach of darkness - the beginning of a
     march two columns was provided.




                              Peter Bagration
                 Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (II)

     The first  column in structure of  28 battalions, 8 escadrons, 72
     infantry and 24 mounted canons and of sappers has received a task
     to move  from Nikolaev on Vishnev. The chief  of a column was the
     commander  of  7-th infantry  corpus general-lieutenant  Raevsky.

     The second  column in  structure 21 battalions,  20 escadrons, 72
     infantry  and 12  horse artillery  and one cossacks  shelf should
     move  from Nikolaev  on Volojin.  The chief  of a column  was the
     commander  of 8-th  infantry corpus  general-lieutenant Borozdin.

     For  every column  special  avant guardes  were allocated.  Avant
     guarde of the first column made Novorossisk and Chernigov Dragoon
     Shelfs, and avant guarde of the second column - Akhtir hussar and
     one cossack shelfs. Rear guard was composed of the Vasil'chikov's
     cavalry group  strengthened by the Narva  infantry and 6-th jager
     shelfs.

     However the  decision to direct army in  two columns on two roads
     Bagration did  not count as a final.  On conditions he assumed to
     set   army   in   one   column  through   Bakshti   to   Volojin.

     In the  morning of June, 22  the 2nd Western  army have started a
     ferry  through  Neman  at  Nikolaev. To  outcome  of  day it  was
     possible  to forward  only  a part  of the  second  column. Other
     armies should  finish a ferry on June,  23, in the early morning.

     In the evening of June, 22 to Nikolaev has arrived Bagration with
     the staff.  Here he  has received the report  from Dorokhov (from
     Volojin) with the message,  that his group which has been cut off
     from 1-st Western army and pursued by the opponent, was moving on
     connection to 2-nd Western army. Dorokhov asked instructions from
     Bagration. Also, an official report from Platov has arrived, that
     informed  about  the fights  with  the opponent,  carried out  by
     cossacks in  the evening of June, 21 and  in the morning of June,
     22 to  the south  of Vishnev, and  also about a  concentration in
     Vishnev of a large forces of enemy armies.

     From the  analysis of  both reports, Bagration  made a completely
     correct conclusion that the  opponent already leaves for a way of
     movement of  2-nd Western  army has drawn. Now  was necessary for
     army to make not the extremely dangerous flank march army, but to
     cut its the way  through armies of the opponent. Despite of these
     unprofitable  developing  conditions,  Bagration  has decided  to
     continue  realization of  a task  in view.  With this  purpose he
     asked Platov to hold  down the opponent in area of Vishnev and be
     ready to  strike together with  the 2-nd Western army  in rear to
     the  enemy,  to  break  it  and  to  provide  an  opportunity  of
     connection with 1-st Western army.

     Bagration has ordered to the group of Dorokhov to keep as long as
     possible Volojin andonly as  a last resort to depart on Kaidanov.

     Simultaneously  Bagration has  made some  changes in  accepted on
     June, 21  the marching order  of 2-nd Western army.  By the order
     given  late  at night  June,  22, Bagration  has established  the
     following  marching order.  The army  concentrates at  Bakshti on
     June, 23 in readiness to begin movement by one column on Volojin.
     The  avand guarde  of the  army was  led by  the General-adjutant
     Vasilchikov and  was composed  of the Akhtir  hussar regiment and
     one  cossack shelf,  Grenader duivision,  Narva infantry and  5th
     jager regiments and mounted artillery unit. Totally there were 12
     battalions,  8  ecadrons,  12  horse artillery  and  one  cossack
     shelve.

     The main  forces should  move in two echelons.  The first echelon
     was consisted of 7-th  infantry corpus made, the Second echelon -
     8-th infantry corpus.

     Bagration  has ordered  to have  one sapper  unit in the  head of
     every column for correction  of roads and bridges. The rear guard
     was composed of 4-th cavalry corpus.

     It was offered to  all parts to go probably wider front on a case
     of a  sudden meeting with the opponent,  and a transport still to
     reduce, having left in Nikolaev all food and medical vehicles and
     all crews  under covering  of one battalion  of an escort  of the
     main apartment and one cossack shelf.

     With a view of  maintenance of confidence of march, Bagration has
     ordered to not plant big fires on camps.

     Making  of   this  decision,  Bagration   well  understood  those
     improbable difficulties  with which  it was necessary  to meet to
     his army.  Later in  the official report  he wrote to  Alexander:
     "the  review for  roads and  the sites  leading from  Nikolaev to
     Vishnev and  Volojin through woods and  bogs, rather inconvenient
     for a fast course of army, and a high level of water in Neman due
     to  strong  rain,  that  has  complicated  very  much  my  ferry,
     represented  me already  a  great difficulties  to transition  of
     space, occupied by the enemy armies".

     Therefore, probably,  already then  he disbelieved in  success of
     the outlined  plan of  actions, but nevertheless,  carrying out a
     will of  king, hoped  to break with  the armies from  Nikolaev on
     connection with 1-st Western army.

     However in  night for June, 23  Bagration has received disturbing
     news about transition in  approach of armies of the right wing of
     French  armies  and  their  output to  Slonim  from  the side  of
     Volkovysk,  and also  to Lipshniki  on the  part of  Grodno. This
     circumstance has made to conditions an essential change. Earlier,
     when armies of the right wing of napoleonic army stayed idle, the
     2nd Western army  might make a march on Vileyko, not being afraid
     for the  rear. Now, when the opponent  goes over to the offensive
     on  a right  wing of  the front,  a real  threat to rear  to 2-nd
     Western army  was created, and it  was necessary to consider with
     this threat.

     Having  attentively estimated  the new conditions,  Bagration has
     understood, that even if the 2nd Western army manages to overturn
     army of  Davout and to break  on connection with the  1st Western
     army, it  would lose a  lot of people, would  lose all transports
     with military  property and would appear  so weakened, that after
     connection would not bring some essential advantage to the common
     interest.  In a  case  of failure  of  break it  would appear  in
     disastrous  position  as on  ways  of its  deviation, there  were
     armies of the right wing of napoleonic army.

     All  these circumstances  have forced  Bagration to give  up from
     performing  the direction  of movement  of the  2nd  Western army
     outlined in  advance by Tsar Alexander I, then  to turn army in a
     new direction and by  that to leave from under covering impact of
     napoleonic armies. Bagration has decided to recede on Nesvij, and
     therefrom to be set  either to Minsk, or to Bobruisk, Borisov, in
     order to  aspire to connection with the 1 st Western army by this
     way.   "This decision  is  regrettable , -  wrote Bagration  from
     Nikolaev  to   Platov,  -    but  it  as  much   is  necessary" .

     In the  morning of  June, 23 under  order of Bagration  the ferry
     through Neman  was stopped,  and armies of  the 2nd  Western army
     have  started   movement  in   direction  Delatichi,  Negnevichi,
     Korelichi. Movement  of army  was made in  the following marching
     order.

     In the  head of  army there was  an avant guarde  in structure of
     Narva infantry,  5th jager, Akhtir  hussar, Lithuanian Ulan, Kief
     Dragoon  regiments,  monuntd  arttilery  unit and  three  cossack
     sheklfs.  In  total  in   avant  guarde  there  were  4  infantry
     battalions,  20  escadrons, 12  horse  artillery and  3 shelf  of
     cossacks. General-aide-de-camp Vasil'chikov led the avant guarde.

     Behind avant  guarde the  main forces, the  7th and  8th infantry
     corps  moved. Both  corps followed independent  marching columns.
     Before   every   column   moved   on   one   unit   of   sappers.

     Marche  of army  was  guarded from  the rear  by two  rear guards
     (infantry and cavalry).

     An Infantry rear guard,  following closer to the main forces, was
     composed  of Summary  grenadierial division  of Vorontsov  with a
     unit  of mounted  artillery  (totally 8  battalions and  12 horse
     artillery).

     Cavalry  rear   guard  under  command   of  general-major  Sivers
     consisted  from   Kharkov,  Chernigov   and  Novorossysk  Dragoon
     Regiments, 6 Cossak shelfs and unit of mounted artillery (totally
     12  squadrons,   12  horse  artillery  and   6  cossack  shelfs).

     Having made  the decision on  deviation of 2nd  Western army from
     Nikolaev  and  its movement  in  a new  direction, Bagration  has
     informed  Platov about  it.  He offered  the last  which  was not
     formally  subordinated to  him,  "by detaining  the enemy  to not
     submit  even  the  slightest   kinds  of  information  about  our
     deviation ".

     The corpus of cossacks, having stood on 23 and June, 24, might in
     night for  June, 25 to recede to Nikolaev.  "After that," - wrote
     Bagration  -   "...We   shall  search  together  means  to  reach
     incorporation with  1st  army. It is  the only way  which however
     gives  us   time  to   incorporate  and  to  not   lose  much  ".

     Waiting  for  the  answer  from  Platov,  Bagration  remained  in
     Nikolaev till 16 pm  of 23 June. Not having received to this term
     of the answer, he  has sent to Platov the second letter in which,
     again having  confirmed the offer stated  in the previous letter,
     asked Platov to notify  on the decision. " If I remain here still
     now, it is only  infor waiting, on what you were solved ". At the
     same time  Bagration specified,  that the ferries  induced by his
     army at Nikolaev and  Koledzani, will remain not destroyed and be
     under covering  of small groups till midday  of June, 24 and then
     will be subjected to destruction.

     Simultaneously with  letters to  Platov, Bagration send  order to
     Dorokhov to recede with  the group to Stolbtsi for the connection
     with the 2nd Western army at Novy Swerjen.

     To evening  of June, 23  the 2nd Western  army reached Korelichi.
     Taking into  account urgent necessity to  arrive to Minsk as soon
     as  possibly  and to  anticipate  an output  there the  opponent,
     Bagration  has   issued  in   Korelichi  the  special   order  on
     acceleration of a march.  He demanded of commanders of divisions,
     corps and regiments to  use everything that during a march to not
     exhaust  and keep  an  army. The  same marching  order  with what
     armies went from Nikolaev up to Korelichi was established. It was
     ordered avant  guarde to step at 7, the 7 th infantry corpus - at
     8, the  8th  infantry corpus - at  9, and rear guard  - after one
     hour  after performance  of 8-th  corpus. Having covered  5 miles
     from a  place of  a lodging for  the night, armies  should have a
     rest for  1 hour, after 10 miles - for 2  hours, after 15 miles -
     for 3  hours and etc. On halts it was  ordered to soldiers to not
     rise before anybody, except for king if at last he has arrived to
     army.  The signal  "field-marshal" was  cancelled. ("a  signal of
     field-marshal" - drumbeat on which for half an hour or hour prior
     to the  beginning of a campaign  of an army rose  from a camp and
     prepared for performance).

     According  to the  order  the 2 nd Western  army  has acted  in a
     direction  to Mir  in the  morning of  June, 24  and concentrated
     there at the outcome of the same day.

     Bagration remained in Korelichi till 20 pm, waiting for news from
     Platov and Dorokhov. Soon official report of Platov was received,
     in  which  Platov  stated   that  according  to  instructions  of
     Bagration,  he will  direct cossacks  on 24  June from  Baksht to
     Nikolaev and  for night  for June, 25  will make a  ferry through
     Neman.  Platov informed also,  that for  acceptance from the  2nd
     Western  army  of  a  ferry  and  its  maintenancein  appropriate
     readiness,  he  has  sent  to  Nikolaev command  led  by  captain
     Tarasov.

     Special   interest  of   Bagration  was   caused  a   message  of
     general-major  Dorokhov  (sent with  Platov's  report) about  the
     deviation  of the  opponent  from Volojin.  Having received  this
     news, Bagration has made  the assumption, that Davout, being sure
     that  2nd  Western  army will  cross the  river at  Nikolaev, has
     decided to concentrate all  forces at Vishnev in order to prevent
     movement    of    Russian   armies    in   northern    direction.

     Proceeding from  this assumption, Bagration made  a conclusion on
     an  opportunity to  reach  connection with  1st  Western  army by
     movement  of 2 nd Western  army in  a direction on  Novy Swerjen,
     Maidanov  Minsk. In  these  circumstances, employment  by Russian
     armies of  Volojin might  detain for some days  progress of enemy
     armies on road to Minsk.

     On June,  24 Bagration has  directed to Platov a  letter in which
     has  offered  him to  borrow  Volojin  together with  a group  of
     general-major Dorokhov  and to  apply all forces  on keeping this
     important  point at  least  till June,  26. With  the  purpose to
     distract  attention  of  the  opponent  from  Volojin,  Bagration
     advised Platov to send  on the part of Nikolaev and Baksht strong
     groups  to  Vishnev and  thus  to  force the  enemy  to think  of
     approach Russians from  Nikolaev. Bagration notified Platov, that
     actions  of  his army  on  Vishnev  will be  maintained by  three
     Dragoon shelfs under command  of general-major Sivers, and in the
     meantime  the main  forces of  the 2 nd Western army,  moving the
     forced marches,  will be forwarded through  Neman in Novy Swerjen
     and on June, 25 will be in Kaidanov, that is all in 40 miles from
     Minsk  and  consequently, will  anticipate  an  output there  the
     armies of Davout.

     In the  instruction it was  emphasized, that movement of  the 2nd
     Western  army  on Maidanov  by  all means  demands employment  of
     Volojin by  Cossacks and Dorokhov's group,  and it was specified,
     that  these  armies  after  achievement  by the  main  forces  of
     Kajdanov will  be supported  by two units  of Cossacks, allocated
     from the 2nd Western army.

     However this  plan was not carried  out. Owing to almost complete
     absence of roads, corpus  of Platov could not to move to Volojin.
     Examination   of  the   location  by  cossacks   has  established
     occurrence on  this way  of infantry of the  opponent. Platov has
     decided,  having directed  a brigade of  general-major Kutejnikov
     with  five hundreds soldiers  of Ataman  Regiment on the  help to
     Dorokhov's  group,  to allocate  other  forces of  the corpus  to
     Nikolaev and  therefrom to be set  on Stolbtsi and Kaylanov, that
     is on the same direction on which the movement of the 2nd Western
     army planned.

     The decision  of Platov  has disturbed Bagration.  However he has
     not left  the idea and still hoped  to anticipate the opponent in
     Minsk.

     On June,  24 Bagration has  directed to Platov a  new letter with
     the request to forward  the corpus entrusted to him through Neman
     in area  of Koledzany,  then to incorporate to  group of Dorokhov
     and to follow on Ivenets, Rakov and Radoshkevichio. In this case,
     specified Bagration,  cossacks, covering all roads  to Minsk from
     the enemy,  may render  essential assistance to 2 nd Western army
     and   together   with    it   successfully   arrive   to   Minsk.

     After moving from Karelichy, Bagration has directed to Platov one
     more letter in which  has again repeated the request. He wrote: "
     I kindly  request to give ways to  Mr. Dorokhov to incorporate to
     you  and that you,  having complied  with my offer,  followed the
     path offered  to your  excellency, covering roads  Minsk from the
     enemy. You, making the march favourable and covering following of
     2-nd army  to Minsk, it is  easy perhaps, will cut  off the enemy
     groups sent on road to Minsk... ".

     However Platov's attempt to  be set in accordance with directives
     specified by  Bagration also has not  crowned success. Before the
     outcome of  June, 24, Cossacks reflected  several attempts of the
     opponent to make the way from Vishnev to Bakshta and to Nikolaev.
     In night  for June, 25 the corpus  was forwarded through Neman at
     Nikolaev and, having destroyed the bridge and ferries, was set on
     Deliatichi,  Lubchu, Koledzan,  intending  there to  be forwarded
     again  through Neman.  To  the moment  of  an exit  of Platov  to
     Koledzan  the ferry  induced there  by the  2nd Western  army and
     protected till midday June, 24, was destroyed.

     Attempt  of   Platov's  corpus   to  pass  Neman   ....  appeared
     impossible.  It  has  forced Platov  to  refuse  from offered  by
     Bagration ways  of movement.  He has turned to  Karelichi and was
     set after the 2nd Western army.

     With  a  deviation  of  the  2 nd  Western  army  from  Nikolaev,
     Napoleon's plan to put Russian army under double impact of armies
     of Davout  and Jerome, that in the  subsequent to surround it and
     tototally destroy,  suffered a failure. This  plan was broken due
     to that  the commander-in-chief  of the 2nd  Western army General
     Bagration has managed to  solve timely a plan of the enemy and to
     deviate the army from under impact.

     Failure  of plans  of  Napoleon was  promoted substantially  by a
     divergence of the commander  right-flank column of the napoleonic
     army Jerome  Bonaparte, who, having occupied  on June, 17 Grodno,
     has not organized immediate pursuance of the 2nd Western army. He
     was late  in Grodno for the whole  five day, engaged with pulling
     up  of  the  armies  and expecting  instructions  from  Napoleon.

     All  this has  allowed  army of  Bagration  to recede  up to  the
     Nikolaev  at absence of  influence on  the part of  the opponent.

     Having learned  about a  failure of the  plan to destroy  the 2nd
     Western army  by drawing  on it of  a double impact  by forces of
     armies of  Davout and  Jerome, Napoleon has come  in strong fury.
     All fault for a  failure of this plan he assigned to the brother,
     seeing in actions of  the last one of principal causes which have
     not allowed him to achieve route of 2nd army.

     Even right at the  beginning of realization of the plan Napoleon,
     coordinating actions of armies  of Davout and Jeromea, complained
     that  badly conducts  investigation  and does  not inform  him on
     conditions. He wrote to the brother:

     "Your courier sent yesterday  at four o'clock in the evening from
     Grodno, arrives to me. Its arrival was extremely pleasant for me,
     as I  hoped, that you have  sent to the chief  of a staff of army
     new datas  on Bagration's  army, on a  direction given by  you to
     Ponjatovsky's    corpus,   and    on   movements    on   Volynia.

     What my  surprise was, when I  have learned, that the  chief of a
     staff of  army has  received from you  only complaints to  one of
     generals. I  can express you only  the displeasure for that small
     quantity of  data on the opponent which I  receive from you. I do
     not know neither the amount of divisions of Bagrations, nor their
     numbers,  a place  where  there was  the last  (Bagration); also,
     neither  those datas which  were received  by you in  Grodno, nor
     what did you do.

     I do  not admit  idea that you  have so badly  executed your duty
     that  do not  pursue the opponent  the very  next day. I  hope at
     least, that prince Ponjatovsky  conducts prosecution with all his
     corpus".

     The especial irritation of  Napoleon has caused news that all his
     worst assumptions have proved  to be true and that Jerome has not
     organized prosecution of army  of Bagration. Napoleon has ordered
     to  the chief  of a staff  marshal Bertie  to direct to  Jerome a
     letter with  expression of  extreme discontent by  actions of the
     last. In the letter it was spoken:

     "Inform the  king of  Westphalia about my  extreme displeasure on
     him for  he has not  directed all armies under  command of prince
     Ponjatovskogo for prosecution of  Bagration to detain army of the
     last and  to stop its  movement... Inform him, that  to direct an
     operation  worse,  than  he   conducted  it  -  is  impossible...

     Tell  him, that  the result  of all  my movements and  optimum of
     cases ever representing on war - is missed owing to the mentioned
     exclusive  oblivion  by him  of  the basic  concepts of  military
     science ".

     Reproaches  of Napoleon have  worked on  Jerome and force  him to
     start  movement from  Grodno.  But time  was already  missed, and
     about   the   coordinated   impact   might   not   be   speeches.

     However Napoleon has not  refused the plan. Aspiring by all means
     to cut off ways  of deviation of the 2nd army and to put it under
     double impact,  he has  thrown armies of  Davout to Minsk  with a
     task to  anticipate an exit there of the  2nd Western army, while
     has  ordered to  army  of Jerome  to pursue  persistently Russian
     army.

     On June, 25 Bagration has received news about promotion of armies
     of   Davout  to   Minsk   and  occupation   by  them   of  Rakov.
     Simultaneously he has learned about the approach to Novogrudok of
     an  advanced  parts  of   the  right  wing  of  napoleonic  army.

     Having   attentively    estimated   conditions,   Bagration   has
     understood, that 2-nd Western  army will not manage to anticipate
     the opponent  in Minsk.  Hence, in case  of movement to  Minsk it
     should enter battle with  armies of Davout at simultaneous action
     against it of the army of Jerome from rear.

     Bagration was compelled to  refuse the planned march to Minsk and
     again to change a direction for deviation of army. He has decided
     to   turn   army  to   Bobruisk   through   Nesvij  and   Slutsk.

     It was  the correct  and unique decision in  those conditions. It
     rescueed 2-nd Western army  from double impact of superior forces
     of  the enemy,  threat  of an  surrounding and  inevitable route.

     On June, 25 under  order of Bagration all transports were sent to
     Nesvij as well as  8-th infantry regiment. Other divisions of the
     2-nd  Western  army  under  personal command  of  Bagration  were
     directed to Novy Swerjen  to accept a group of Dorokhov, that was
     receding there.

     In the evening in Novy Swerjen, Dorokhov's group has incorporated
     to the  2-nd Western army and arrived  together with it to Nesvij
     next day.

     Thus, to  outcome of June,  26 all divisions of  the 2-nd Western
     army concentrated  in Nesvij. Taking into  account strong fatigue
     of  the armies  exhausted  by continuous  marches within  10 day,
     without rests, Bagration has  decided to give army a rest. Active
     preparation  of armies  for new,  not less difficult  and complex
     march was simultaneously conducted.

     Right at the beginning  of realization of his decision, Bagration
     again faced  intervention in  his actions of the  king, trying to
     order instructions for the  2-nd Western army without a knowledge
     and  the account  of  that concrete  conditions in  which  it was
     necessary to operate.

     On 25 June when Bagration with the main forces of the army was in
     Novy Swerjen, aide-de-camp of Tsar Benkendorf has arrived with an
     order about  the necessity  for the 2 nd Western army  to move to
     Minsk.

     The same  task was put to carry out  which Bagration tried in the
     beginning of  war but  which was cancelled by  the instruction of
     king received in Zelva. But if then, in the beginning of war when
     the  opponent was still  in Vilno,  realization of this  task was
     possible,  now  when  the  group  of  armies  of  Davout  already
     approached  to Minsk, and  from rear  there came group  of Jerome
     Bonaparte,  performance   of  this  instruction  was  impossible.
     Moreover, in  case of attempt of its  performance the 2nd Western
     army  might come  to  be in  disastrous position  for  itself on.

     Deeply understanding  the responsibility for destiny  of the army
     entrusted to  him, Bagration  might not execute an  order of Tsar
     and  has decided  to  carry out  the  planned plan.  He has  sent
     Alexander the letter in which informed, that the 2nd Western army
     has  already changed  a direction  of the movement,  intending to
     make a march through Nesvij and Slutsk to Bobruisk. This decision
     testifies to  the huge courage of  Bagration, who have not afraid
     to  go   contrary  to   will  of  Tsar  in   interests  of  army.

     So,  the 2 nd Western  the army  has settled  down in  Nesvij and
     prepared for  a march to Bobruisk.  Platov's Cossacks departed on
     the south from Nikolaev and according to the decision of the main
     command passed in direct submission of Bagration. The order on it
     was handed  by Benkendorf to Bagration  in Novy Swerjen. All this
     considerably facilitated position of the 2nd army, as a threat of
     route of it parts was eliminated.

     Having  notified  Platov  about  transition of  cossacks  in  the
     submission, Bagration has ordered to him to depart on Novogrudok,
     Stvolichi  and Snov  to  cover thus  a concentration  of  army in
     Nesvij and then to follow to Nesvij and serve as an rear guard of
     the 2nd army.

     Platov has received Bagration's  order in night for June, 26 when
     his  armies already  approached  to the  Mir, and  Novogrudok was
     already in hands of the opponent.

     With a  view of maintenance Nesvij from the  west, he has sent in
     polonechki  and Snov  three units  of Cossacks with  an aggregate
     number  in 1500  persons under  command of  general-major Karpov.

     Platov has  informed Bagration  about the accepted  decision. The
     last, having  approved this  decision, has ordered  Platov to pay
     special attention  to necessity to keep Mir.  Only in case of the
     significant superiority of enemy  forces Platov was authorized to
     recede  to Nesvij.  Deduction of  Mir might  provide to  the main
     forces  of  2-nd Western  army  an  opportunity to  have a  rest.

     Having received order about the necessity to keep Mir, Platov has
     begun its performance. He has decided to apply favourite tactical
     disposition, the so-called "Venter".  The essence of this methode
     was to  entice the opponent in  an ambush, and then  to strike on
     him from different directions,  to surround and destroy. By June,
     27 near  Mir, at direct order of  Platov there were several units
     of cossacks and unit of the mounted artillery.

     He has put one  unit of cossacks in Mir, and others were deployed
     to the  south from Mir in a grove  Jablonovshina. Ahead of Mir on
     road  to Karelichi  100  cossacks were  put forward.  Twi hundred
     cossacks were  placed on both sides of  road in the latent places
     in an ambush.

     In the early morning  June, 27 in a direction on Mir, the brigade
     under  command of  the general  Turne from  the 4-th  division of
     light cavalry  of the  4-th cavalry corpus  has gone over  to the
     offensive.

     Ahead came  3rd Uhlan Brigade,  and after it -  other forces of a
     brigade -  15-th and 16-th Divisions. All  three squadrons of the
     3rd  Uhlan Brigade moved on  road to Mir one  after another. When
     gone ahead squadron has approached to Cossacks, the last began to
     depart quickly to Mir.

     The opponent began to pursue Cossacks and has rushed in pursuance
     in  Mir.  On southern  surburb  location  Cossacks together  with
     another Cossack  Regiment has  passed in approach  and has pushed
     aside the opponent. The enemy was overturned and has addressed in
     chaotic flight.  At this time hundreds  of cossacks strike on the
     enemy  from flanks  and from  front. The  3-rd Uhlan  Brigade was
     surrounded and almost completely  destroyed. Only to the rests of
     the brigade  was possible to break from an  ambush. To the aid of
     the 3 rd Bridgade, general Turne  directed three Uhlan squadrons.
     However  arrival of  fresh forces  has not rescued  position. The
     opponent  again was overturned  by vigorous  attack and run  in a
     panic.

     In fight under Mir June, 27 on the part of Russian operated about
     4  thousand persons,  and  on the  part of  the  French -  over 2
     thousand persons. The French have lost 8 officers and 348 private
     soldiers  killed, wounded  and  in a  captivity. Russian  lost 25
     persons killed and wounded.

     Having found  out about  route by 2-nd Uhlan  brigades under Mir,
     the French command has set other forces of 4-th division of light
     cavalry against squadrons of Platov.

     From his  part, Bagration,  having received official  report from
     Platov about  the carried out  fight, has ordered to  the last to
     continue keeping the opponent at Mir. On strengthening of Platov,
     he has  directed group under command  Vasilchikov in structure of
     three cavalry units.

     Next day Platov has  decided to repeat tactical disposition which
     has excellently  managed in fight of  June, 27. With this purpose
     he  has ordered to  rear guard  (three regiments of  cossacks) to
     entice the  opponent on  road from Mir  to the south,  and to the
     main forces  located to  south-west from Simkovo and  has set the
     task to put to the opponent impact in flank.

     Besides  he has sent  the order  to brigade of  Kuteynikov which,
     moving  after  group  of  Dorokhov,  has  reached  to  this  time
     Stolbtsi, to  move immediately to Simkovo,  in order to take part
     together  with main  forces in  a surrounding and  destruction of
     enemy armies.

     However the opponent considered lessons of fight of June, 27 and,
     being afraid of an ambush, showed care. After Russian rear guard,
     the French  command directed only 7-th  Regiment of 1-st Brigade,
     while other forces of  4-th division of light cavalry has stopped
     at Simakov,  (the 2-nd brigade settled  down on southwest surburb
     of a  village, and 2nd and 11-th regiments  of the 1-st brigade -
     on northern.)

     In these  conditions Platov  has changed an  initial plan, having
     decided  to crush  the enemy  by courageous and  vigorous impact.
     Under  his order at  13 pm parts  of the  former rear guard  in a
     structure of one Cossavck, Akhtyrsk hussar, Kiev Dragoon and 2-nd
     Don  Horse-battery unit  attacked  7-th Uhlan  Regiment and  have
     rejected it  to Simakov.  Simultaneously main forces  of Cossacks
     attacked 2-nd  Uhlan brigade. Approach of  Russian forces at once
     has created  threat of  cutting of the  left flank of  the French
     armies.

     The French command has  put forward to the aid of 7-the Regiment,
     a  squadron  of 2-nd  Uhlan  Brigade  which till  that  was in  a
     reserve. Besides it has  developed more to the left of road 11-th
     Uhlan regiment and one  Squadron of the 16-th Uhlan Regiment. The
     2-nd Uhlan  Regiment without  squadron (that was  settled down to
     the  north  from  Simakov), continued  to  remain  in a  reserve.

     By these actions, the  French command managed to liquidate threat
     of cutting of the left flank of its army. At the front attacks of
     the  main  forces  of  Platov,  the  French  also  showed  fierce
     resistance.

     Persistent fight proceeded within six hours. From both parties it
     was conducted with an  exclusive pressure, but to any of them did
     not give  overweight. At 21 pm  Kuteynikov Brigade has approached
     to  a battlefield,  having made  from Stolbtsy the  forced march.

     Having  developed  between  villages  Podlesye  and  Ozersk,  the
     brigade directly has entered into fight, suddenly having attacked
     the opponent  from the  left flank and  rear. Simultaneously main
     forces of  Cossacks have  struck from front and  the right flank.

     The  opponent has  not sustained  the coordinated impact  and has
     addressed  in  chaotic  flight.  Cossacks vigorously  pursue  it.
     During  operations  under Mir  on  June,  28 Belorussian  peasant
     Denis,  the  inhabitant of  village  Simakovo was  distinguished.

     He was sent together with a group of cossacks in Stolbtsy that to
     lead therefrom to a place of fight a brigade of Kuteynikov. Denis
     has carried  out this  task exemplary. He  has lead a  brigade on
     shortest way well known  to him, and thus promoted duly its input
     in fight.

     In fights  of 27  and 28 June  under Mir the army  of Platov have
     crushed 9 enemy units. It was the first victory of Russian armies
     during the Great Patriotic war of 1812.

     This victory  has installed  in Russian army a  confidence of the
     its forces  and, having detained the  opponent at Mir, allowed to
     2-nd Western army to have a rest in Nesvij and to be prepared for
     the further movement to Bobruisk.

     The 2 nd Western army began march from  Bobruisk on June, 28. The
     main forces  of army moved on two  echelons. In the first echelon
     there  was  8-th infantry  Regiment,  and  in the  second -  7-th
     infantry Regiment. The first  echelon has acted from Nesvij at 18
     pm  on June, 28,  and the second  - in  the morning of  June, 29.

     Making a  march in  such order, the  main forces of  2-nd Western
     army  arrived to  Tymkovichy at  the evening  of June,  29, where
     Bagration received  through aide  -de camp Volkonskly  Czar's new
     instructions. Alexander  I wrote  to Bagration, that  movement of
     2-nd Western army to Bobruisk was extremely harmful, and insisted
     on  necessity of  movement  to Minsk.  "  I  do hope,  that after
     reception of  my commands . . . . . you  shall again address on a
     former  direction.  . .  "   -- was  written  in an  instruction.

     Alexander's instructions did not correspond to conditions at all.
     Therefore Bagration  might not  change already begun  movement of
     armies. Having  explained in details the  heavy position in which
     there was 2nd Western army, Bagration has informed Alexander that
     the  army will continue  movement to  Bobruisk and that  the only
     extreme  situation,  compelled  it  to move  in  this  direction.

     The  2nd  Western  army continued  a march.  On  June, 30  it has
     achieved  Romanov, and  on July,  1 -  Slutsk. March of  army was
     reliably  covered from  rear by  the rear  guard, which  was made
     still with  corps of Platov strengthened  with group Vasilchykov.
     Taking into  account the  circumstance, that avant  guards of the
     opponent have  entered into direct contact  with his rear guards,
     Bagration has  taken additional measures on  amplification of the
     last. He has supported it by the Grenadier division of Vorontsov.

     Within June,  29 Platov's rear guard stood  to the south from Mir
     in readiness to repulse new approach of the enemy, providing thus
     a march of 2 nd Western army. In the evening of June, 29, carried
     out of  the task, it began  a withdrawal after army  and to night
     for June, 30 has arrived in Nesvij.

     In  the morning  June,  30 Platov  has ordered  to  the Grenadier
     Division to act on  Timkovichy and then to follow to Romanov. The
     division should  be all time for a  half of distance between army
     and cossacks. The  group the general-aide-de-camp Vasilchykov was
     ordered to  followi the  Grenadier division, being  between to it
     abd cossacks.

     In  night  for  July, 1,  Platov  with  ten cossacks  regiments,.
     Lithuanian  Uhlan Regiment  and Don horse-artillery,  having left
     Nesvij,  has followed  Vasilchikov. The  withdrawal of  all these
     armies  was  covered by  especially  allocated  rear guard  under
     command  of  general-major Karpov  in  structure  of two  Cossack
     Regiments.

     While the  2nd Western army  make a march from  Nesvij on road to
     Bobruisk, the French command prepared a new impact against it. It
     has  decided  to  undertake  in  a  second  time  an  attempt  of
     surrounding and destruction of  Bagration. With this purpose army
     of Davout, which has reached about midday of June, 26 Minsk, were
     divided into two groups.

     One group under davout's personal leadership, was ordered to come
     in a southeast direction,  to leave in area of Bobruisk for a way
     of deviation  of 2-nd Western army and  together with the army of
     Jerome Bonaparte, put on  it a double impact. In this group there
     were 29  battalions and 34 squadrons  with an aggregate number in
     21 thousand soldiers.

     Another  group  under  command of  Grushy  (7  battalions and  27
     squadrons, with a total  number about 9 thousand men) was ordered
     to go in a northeast direction, to seize Borisov and cutt off the
     way  of 2-nd  Western army,  in a  case if  last manage  to avoid
     collision with Davout and go along Berezina or Dnepr to the north
     on connection with 1-st Western army.

     Napoleon warned of an opportunity of such change of events Davout
     by a special letter. "It is seemed to me obvious - Napoleon wrote
     -  that Bagration first  of all  should make attempt  of movement
     upwards the left coast of Berezina. As soon as he finds out, that
     you have occupied Borisov and move in this direction, he will try
     to rise  upwards on the right  coast of Dnepr and,  at last, when
     will be convinced that  it is impossible in an equal measure, he,
     probably,   will   proceed   Dnepr   to   go   to   Smolensk   ".

     Avant  guardes  of  both  groups  have  acted  in  the  specified
     directions  immediately after  occupation of  Minsk, and  in some
     days after them, the main forces were set also.

     On  a direction  of  approach of  Grushy actually  there  was not
     Russian army  at all. The  only barrier for the  opponent was the
     fortress   of  Borisov,   which  defense  was   organized  badly.
     Construction of  strengthenings to the moment  of approach of the
     French armies  was not  finished. The garrison  of city consisted
     from two units of the sappers, two spare battalions of Jagers and
     cossacks. The  aggregate number of garrison  was only 400 persons
     who were  taking place  under command of  colonel Gressera. There
     was no field artillery  in Borisov at all, only 16 pig-iron siege
     canons.

     Having received  information on  approach to Borisov  of an enemy
     army,  colonel  Gresser  has   decided,  in  a  view  of  obvious
     insufficiency  of  his,  to  leave  Borisov,  preliminary  having
     destroyed in all foodstuffs, the weapon and an ammunition, and to
     recede through Mogilyov, Bobruisk on connection with 2-nd Western
     army.

     Under the order of  colonel Gresser, Russians burnt 1960 quarters
     of a flour, 183 quarters of groats, 2345 quarters straw and 19500
     poods  of hay. Besides  100 pounds  of gunpowder were  flooded in
     Berezina and  16 canons were destroyed  and damaged. The garrison
     of  city has  burnt  out the  bridge through  Berezina and  at 10
     o'clock in the morning on June, 30 has acted from Borisov on road
     to Mogilyov. This very day advanced parts of group of Grushy have
     entered the city.

     Simultaneously with promotion of  group Grushy to Borisov, Davout
     made approach  to a southeast from Minsk  to Bobruisk. By July, 1
     the  avant guarde  of  this group  has reached  Jegumen,  and its
     inteligence  groups have  appeared  at Svyloch  in 40  miles from
     Bobruisk. Occurrence of the  opponent in immediate proximity from
     Bobruisk again  has created menacing conditions  for 2-nd Western
     army which again might  appear between two fires - army of Davout
     from front and army of Jerome from rear.

     Bagration has learned about these events on July, 1 when the main
     forces of 2-nd Western army have reached Slutsk. Having estimated
     conditions,  he has  decided  to force  a  march of  the army  to
     Bobruisk to  anticipate opponent's way out  there. With a view of
     acceleration  of   movement  and   maintenance  of  army   of  an
     opportunity of  more free maneuvering, it  was decided to release
     it  from extra  transports.  According to  Bagration's order  all
     vehicles,  except  for food  and  an infirmary  were directed  to
     Petrikov,  in   order  to  to  forward   there  through  Pripyat,
     concentrate in  Mozyr and arrive under  protection of the reserve
     corps. For covering transports during their movement to Mozyr the
     special  group  under   command  of  vice-colonel  Klenovsky  was
     allocated.  The group  consist of  a Grenadier  battalion, Slutsk
     garrison command and a part of cossacks.

     The big interest is represented with organization by Bagration of
     marching  movement of  army. The  marching order accepted  by him
     allowed to  make the way forward  in case of an  exit on a way of
     movement   of  Russian   army   of  the   Davout's  forces,   and
     simultaneously   to  beat   off   army  of   Jerome  from   rear.

     The  7-th  infantry  corp   with  the  27-th  infantry  division,
     Novorossyisk  and Chernigov  Dragoon and Izymsk  Hussar Regiments
     and most part of  cossacks has made the first echelon with a task
     to   repulse  the   attacking   enemy  and   move  to   Bobruisk.

     The 8-th  infantry corps,  rear guard of Platov  and the Grenadie
     division, made  the second  echelon and were  orderedto resist to
     Jerome Bonaparte's army.

     All  staying  at  army transports  moved  between  7-th and  8-th
     infantry corps,  being covered with them  both from armies Davout
     and Jerome.

     For  successful  performance  of  Bagration's  decision,  it  was
     required, that transports had  time to pass on road to Petrikov a
     sufficient distance  and to  appear in safe  position. Besides it
     was necessary,  that the first echelon  has passed distance which
     would allow movement the  transports which have stayed at armies,
     and other forces of 2-nd Western army.

     In this  situation the  important role dropped out  on a Platov's
     rear guard which should  restrain the enemy, providing a march of
     the  main  forces  of army.  Bagration  has  ordered to  organize
     withdrawal of  the rear guard with a  calculation to not press on
     army. "If  they will leave us in rest for two  or three marshes -
     Bagration  wrote to  Platov  - then  I hope,  we shall  make well
     business "

     Bagration  assumed to start  a march  from Slutsk to  Bobruisk on
     July, 2. However owing to a delay with departure of transports to
     Mozyr, the beginning of march was to postpone for whole day. This
     circumstance increased  in the greater degree  a role of Platov's
     rear guard  which should  detain approach of the  opponent by all
     means, having  provided the  main forces of 2-nd  Western army an
     opportunity  of unobstructed  marching  from Slutsk,  and to  the
     transports sent on road  to Mozyr - a traffic safety in the given
     direction.

     In connection  with change of conditions  an additional order was
     sent  to  Platov, in  which  Bagration demanded  to locate  corps
     entrusted  to him  (Platov) in  Romanov and  to use all  means to
     detain the opponent till night of July, 3.

     In night  for July,  4 Platov should  act to Slutsk  and, passing
     this point, stop on  road to Glusk (at a fork to Petrikov) and be
     there all the day, that is before night.

     According to received order, Platov settle down the rear guard at
     Romanov in the following disposition.

     The 5-th Jager regiment  was put in Romanov. Don horse-artillery,
     divided  into two  batteries  of 6  canons in  each,  occupied an
     advantage-ground  at  river Wusvo  (to  northeast from  Romanov).
     Platov has  arranged main  forces on a  right shore of  Wusva: on
     right  flank, in  thrickets  of the  bush, two  cossack regiments
     under command Ilovayskyt, in  the centre - group under command of
     karpov  , and  on  the left  flank, in  bushes  to the  east from
     Savkovo  - brigade  Kuteynikov. Cossaclks  were put ahead  of the
     main forces.

     The reserve made Ataman regiment, settled down for the centre and
     a group of Vasilchikov, to east from Romanov.

     Platov  intended to put  defeat to  the opponent moving  in avant
     guarde and  to reject them  from Romanov. In case  of approach of
     superior forces, he assumed  to allocate the troops for the river
     and,  having destroyed  bridges, to  defend this  position before
     night as has ordered Bagration.

     In the  morning July, 3 the avant guard of  the right wing of the
     French army, has gone  over to the offensive on Romanov. The 1-st
     Jager  Regiment, being one  of the  best regiments of  the French
     cavalry, moved ahead,. At  approach of the opponent Cossacks, not
     entering fight, began to  depart. Pursuing them, the opponent has
     approached  to Romanov,  where was  met and attacked  by Karpov's
     forces.

     The commander of 1-st Jager Regiment has developed 2-nd battalion
     in a  shooting circuit  which has fastened  firing with cossacks.

     Having  convinced  in  the  superiority of  Russian  armies,  the
     commander of  French regiment has decided  to depart, but at this
     time has  received an  order with the  categorical requirement to
     attack  Platov. It  has forced  him to  start preparation  for an
     attack.  He has  reconstructed  the squadrons  and  3rd  and 4 th
     squadrons were put forward.

     In the  meantime Platov,  having found out about  weakness of the
     opponent,  suddenly has  decided to  put a  strong impact  on it.

     Group of  Karpov attacked  the enemy from  front, and Ilovaysky's
     Regiment together  with Kuteynikov's  brigade - from  flanks. The
     opponent  was   overturned  and  inverted   in  flight.  Cossacks
     vigorously pursued him.

     The 1-st Jager Regiment  was completely defeated. The participant
     of events,  Polish general Kolachkovsky, marks  in the notes that
     it was  possible to rescue only to the one who  had a good horse.
     "This brilliant  regiment -  wrote Kolachkovsky  - totaling about
     700 cavalrymen, has lost  half of structure and might not recover
     during all campaign"

     When  the chief  of avant  guarde of  right wing  Latur-Mobur has
     received the  report on this defeat, he  has quickly set with all
     light   cavalry  to   Romanov.   Platov's  troops   have  stopped
     prosecution and went on  left coast of Wusva, having settled down
     in  two groups  to the  north and  to the south  Romanov. Bridges
     through the river were burnt.

     Having  came  to the  river,  the  opponent has  put forward  the
     battery  and  fastened  firing  with Russian  armies.  From  both
     parties a  strong artillery  fire was conducted, and,  it must be
     mentioned, that six canons  of Don arttilery fired at the battery
     of  the  opponent, and  other  six  - on  an  enemy cavalry.  The
     opponent has suffered losses  and was compelled to depart back to
     Romanov.

     Russians  have stood  all day  at Romanov  on 3 July.  To evening
     Platov has  received order  from Bagration - to  leave in Romanov
     horse rear guard, and to move to Glutsk with other forces, and to
     arrive there in the morning of 5 July. According to this order in
     night,   Platov  began   moving  on   road  Slutsk  on   4  July.

     March of  2-nd Western army  from Slutsk to Bobruisk  was made in
     very difficult conditions. The  sandy road which was taking place
     on  continuous marshland,  summer heat  and wood fires,  rare and
     underpopulated points, lack of drinking water - all this strongly
     exhausted staff. But  Bagration's army have successfully overcome
     difficulties of a march. On July, 5 the first echelon of army has
     arrived to  Bobruisk, and  on July, 6  also other forces  of army
     have concentrated there.

     Thus,  as   a  result  of  skilful   organization  and  speed  of
     realization  of a  march, the  2nd  Western army  has anticipated
     enemy armies on way  to Bobruisk. A plan of French command to cut
     off ways  of a withdrawal of  the 2nd Western  army and to put it
     under double impact again has failed.

     On July, 7 in  Bobruisk through aide-de-camp Volkonsky, Bagration
     has received  Alexander's instructions on the  further actions of
     2-nd Western  army. According to these  instructions the army was
     ordered to be forwarded  through Dnepr, to be set to Smolensk and
     to anticipate there the French armies.

     Present conditions extremely complicated performance of a task in
     view. The matter is  that the French command, having lost hope to
     block Bagration  a way  of deviation to Bobruisk,  has decided to
     carry out it on  Dnepr, at Mogilyov where the only constant ferry
     through Dnepr was located.

     According  to it, the  fast promotion  of Davout to  Mogilyov has
     begun  and to  the  moment of  reception by  Bagration  of Czar's
     instructions, the  opponent was  on distance of  four transitions
     (85 kms)  from Mogilyov, while  the 2nd Western  army was removed
     from it on six transitions (120 kms). Hence, if 2nd army has made
     attempt to  make use of a  ferry at Mogilyov, it  should face the
     main  forces of Davout's  army. Construction  by army of  a ferry
     through  Dnepr to  the  south of  Mogilyov, where  there  were no
     constant ferries,  would demand  a lot of time,  and the opponent
     would receive an opportunity  to pass Dnepr and to seize Smolensk
     prior to Russian army.

     But there were on other solution of this sutuation, and Bagration
     has decided  to move  army through Stary Bikhov  to Mogilyov with
     the  purpose either  to fight  and to  break through  Mogilyov on
     connection  with  1-st  Western  army  or  to use  fight  in  the
     demonstrative purposes to keep  Davout on a right coast of Dnepr,
     and in the meantime, having secretly forwarded the main forces of
     army  to  the  south  of  Mogilyov,  to move  them  to  Smolensk.

     On July,  7 according to  the accepted decision, the  2nd Western
     army have moved from Bobruisk in order to go through Stary Bikhov
     to Mogilyov. The avant  guarde under command of colonel Sysoev in
     structure of five Cossack Regiments went ahead.

     After  it the  avant guarde  of active  armed forces  moved under
     command  of  general-aide-de-camp  Vasilchikov  in  structure  of
     Akhtyrsk hussar  and Kiev Dragoon  Regiments with horse-artillery
     (totally 12 squadrons and 12 horse artillery).

     On a  march this avant guarde was replaced  by a new avant guarde
     of  active armed  forces under  command of  general-major Syvers,
     (Novorossyisk  and  Chernigov  dragoon  Regiments (8  squadrons).

     The main forces moved in two echelons. The first echelon was made
     by the 7-th infantry and 4-th cavalry corps and a pioneer unit of
     vice-colonel  Orlov.  This  echelon   had  the  avant  guarde  in
     structure of two Jager  Regiments.. In total in the first echelon
     there  were 28  battalions,  16 squadrons,  72 artillery  and one
     pioneer unit.

     The second echelon was  composed of the 8-th infantry corps, 27th
     infantry division,  1-st and 18-th Jager  Regiments and a pioneer
     unit of captain Zotov.  In avant guarde of the second echelon two
     Jager Regiments moved also.  In total in the second echelon there
     were 28  battalions, 20  squadrons, 72 artillery  and one pioneer
     unit.

     March  was  covered by  two  rear  guards. One  under command  of
     general-major  Vorontsov,  consisted  of  the  Summary  grenadier
     division, 5-th Jager Regiment, Kharkov Dragoon Regiment and horse
     artillery,  all  from 12  battalions,  4 squadrons  and 12  horse
     artillery. Another  rearguard was made by  irregular trrops under
     command of the general-major  Karpov - two Cossacks Regiments and
     Don horse-artillery (12 artillery).

     Simultaneously  with   organization  of  a   march  to  Mogilyov,
     Bagration  has  ordered  to   the  chief  of  engineers  to  make
     recognition of Dnepr to the south of Mogilyov with the purpose of
     construction there the bridge in case the 2-nd Western army would
     be unable to make the way through Mogilyov.

     On July, 9 Davout has sent from Mogilyov on road on the south the
     3-rd  Jager Reguiment with  a task  to pursue departing  group of
     colonel Gresser.

     At the same time  the avant guarde of the irregular trrops of the
     2nd  Western Army came nearer to  Mogilyov from the south, having
     ordered  to  learn  about   the  opponent  forces  in  the  city.

     Having passed Saltanovka, Russian  avant guarde has collided with
     the 3rd Jager Regiment of the opponent.

     Sysoev  has developed the  regiments in  one line (in  the centre
     there was one regiment, and on flanks - two Cossack regiments) In
     such fighting  order Sysoev  amicably attacked the  opponent. The
     regiment, taking place in  the centre, has struck from front, and
     other  regiments -  from  flanks. The  opponent does  not sustain
     attack of cossacks and has taken to flight. Cossacks persistently
     pursued the enemy up to the city.




                              Peter Bagration
                 Hero of the Great Pariotic War 1812 (III)

     Having met resistance 85-th linear regiment with two canons, that
     was  put forward  by  Davout to  the  aid of  jagers, Sysoev  has
     suspended   prosecution    and   has    departed   to   Buynichy.

     During  this fight  the  opponent has  suffered from  significant
     losses. Russians  have captured 215 men,  including the commander
     of 3-rd Jager Regiment, the colonel of Sen-Mars.

     Having found out about  that Davout have already seized Mogilyov,
     Bagration has  decided to  lead forces of  7-th infantry division
     and attacj  enemy in  accordance with earlier  accepted plan. The
     purpose of  fight was  to find out  structure of enemy  armies in
     area of Mogilyov and  in case if in this area there would be only
     advanced  parts  of  Davout's  army  to  seize  Mogilyov,  having
     provided thus 2-nd Western army a ferry through Dnepr. If in area
     of Mogilyov  there are main forces  of Davout, Bagration expected
     to use attack with the purpose to keep the opponent on a position
     at  Mogilyov, and in  the meantime  to forward 2-nd  Western army
     through Dnepr to the  south of Mogilyov and to set it on a forced
     march to Smolensk.

     Bagration  persistently  demanded   from  Rayevsky  to  speed  up
     attacking   opponent    to   prevent    its   strengthening   and
     simultaneously  took  vigorous  measures  on search  of  a  ferry
     between Mogilyov and Stary Bikhov. Bagration wrote to Rayevsky on
     July, 11:

     "If our Lord would give us an opportunity to find a ferry between
     you and Stary Bikhov, then we shall immediately cross the river".

     To outcome  of July, 10  ( 22 ) Bgagration's  troops occupied the
     following  position.  7-th   infantry  division  settle  down  at
     Dashkovka,  8-th  infantry  corps  -  at  Stary  Bikhov,  in  one
     transition from  7-th Division. Platov also  arrived there with a
     purpose to  pass over Dnepr in this point  and to move along left
     shore on connection with 1-st Western army.

     Bagration  assumed to attack  the opponent  on July, 12.  By this
     time he intended to  concentrate in area to the south of Mogilyov
     all his  armies. In  connection with forthcoming  fight Bagration
     temporarily  asked Platov  to postpone  a ferry of  corps through
     Dnepr.

     In  the meantime  Davout,  having found  out about  intentions of
     Bagration, has  begun looking for battle  place to detain Russian
     army.  Taking   into  account   presence  in  its   structure  of
     significant cavalry  and artillery forces, Davout  has selected a
     position  at  Saltanovka.  The  position  had  extent  about  two
     kilometers and  was limited from the east  by Dnepr, and from the
     west  -  by  forests.  From front  it  was  covered  by a  spring
     Saltanovka  which proceeded  from northwest  on a southeast  in a
     ravine and ran to Dnepr.

     Davout has occupied the  specified position, having the following
     fighting order. On right flank, at fatova, five battalions of the
     108-th and  one battalion of 85-th  linear regiments were settled
     down.  On  the  left  flank,  at  Saltanovka,  there  were  three
     battalions  of 85-th  linear  regiment. Behind  the right  flank,
     between  villages  Fatova and  Selen,  four  battalions of  61-st
     linear regiment,  were located and at  village Solets the general
     reserve stood in structure of 5-th Cuirassiers division, rests of
     the  3rd  Jager Regiment  and two  battalions of 61-st  and 85-th
     linear regiments.

     About 7 pm on July, 11 avant guarde of 7-th corps of Russian army
     in structure  of 6-th  and 42-nd Jager  regiments began offensive
     from Saltanovka  direction. Having  rejected sentry posts  of the
     opponent, it has reached  the bridge at 8 pm. Despite of a strong
     gun  and artillery  fire,  which opponent  conducted from  a left
     coast, the  Jagers under  command of colonel  Glebov overcome the
     bridge and  continued to  be advanced, but soon,  attacked by the
     85-th  regiment of  the  French, were  compelled to  depart back.

     Having  arrived  to  a  battle  place  and  estimated  situation,
     Rayevsky was convinced of  difficulty of realization of attack on
     the given direction, and also has clearly seen threat to the left
     flank of  the corps  from the opponent forces  located at Fatova.

     In this  connection he made decision  to attack the French armies
     simultaneously in  directions on  Saltanovka and Fatova,  and the
     main forces  were intended  for approach to  the first direction,
     and parts  of 26-th  infantry division of general  Paskevich - on
     the second.

     According to  the accepted decision, 26-th  infantry division was
     ordered to  make maneuver on a  narrow wood footpath aside Fatova
     and to attack French  armies. The beginning of this attack should
     serve as  a signal for transition in  approach of the main forces
     of 7-th infantry corps.

     Division of Paskevich has  acted on performance of a task in view
     by  one  column. Two  battalions  of Orlov  and Nizhniy  Novgorod
     Regiments  with 12  artillery  were put  ahead, further  followed
     Poltava Regiments,  Ladoga Regiment,  1 battalion of  the Nizhniy
     Novgorod  Regiment  and a  cavalry,  which brought  up the  rear.

     At  the approach  to Fatova  in a  wood, battalions of  the 20-th
     infantry division  have met a  battalion of the 85 th regiment of
     the opponent.  This battalion  which has been put  forward on the
     right coast  of the spring,  intended for attack in  flank of the
     Russian forces moving to Saltanovka. Russian Jagers have detained
     progress  of the  French battalion  and removed  it from  a wood.

     To the  aid of this battalion, the  French command has directed a
     battalion of  108-th Regiment. Both french  battalions lacated at
     height  to the  south from  Fatoba in  a columns with  a shooting
     circuit ahead.

     Paskevich, having  developed on  a marge of a  wood battalions of
     Orlov and  Nizhniy Novgorod regiments, has  ordered to attack the
     opponent  resolutely. Russian  battalions  with a  shout "Hurrah"
     have  overturned  the opponent  and,  pursuing  him, have  seized
     Fatova. Put forward on  height to the south from Fatova 12 canons
     supported the attack of infantry battalions.

     After an  exit from  a village, Russian  battalions were suddenly
     attacked  by four  battalions of  the 108-th regiment,  that were
     stealthily  laying in  neigh.  A fierce  hand-to-hand fight  took
     place,  in which  despite  shown exclusive  courage and  heroism,
     Russians were compelled to start a withdrawal.

     Almost simultaneously  with transition in  approach of battalions
     of  Orlov and  Nizhniy Novgorod  Regiments, the  Poltava Regiment
     have   began   offensives.   At   first  its   attack   developed
     successfully.  Regiment  has  passed  spring at  the  bridge  and
     attacked facing to the west from Fatova a battalion of the 108-th
     French regiment. However soon the opponent has entered into fight
     two  battalions of  61-st  regiment which  put impact  in Poltava
     regiment's flank and have forced it to recede.

     In the meantime Paskevich has put forward on height 6 more caons,
     has deployed  Ladoga Regiment at height to  the west of road, and
     allocated rifle men further  to the west, in a wood. These troops
     have  broken all  attempts of  the opponent  to forward  over the
     spring on the left flank and in the centre.

     On right flank, two  French battalion, pursuing battalions of the
     Orlov  and Nizhniy  Novgorod  Regiments departing  from the  left
     shore,  imanaged to  cross the  spring and  to capture  the right
     flank of Paskevich's division.

     With the purpose to liquidate the threat which has hung above the
     right  flank,  Paskevich  has  put  forward  against  the  French
     battalions  Poltava  Regiment,  behind   of  which  has  put  the
     four-cannon battery.

     The French resolutely attacked  Poltava Regiment. The last slowly
     began to recede on  the battery. After approaching to battery, it
     has  quickly parted  in  both sides,  and coming  columns  of the
     opponent   appeared   in    front   of   the   Russian   battery.

     Russian  gunners met  the enemy  with pernicious fire.  After it,
     infantrymen   of  the   Poltava  Regiment  attacked   the  French
     battalions   and  have   rejected   them  to   the  left   shore.

     While there  were these events, on a  direction of actions of the
     main  forces of  7-th  case there  was following  situations. For
     approach  on Saltanovka  general Rayevsky  has deployed  a column
     from  Smolensk  infantry  Regiment, which  was  one  of the  best
     regiments of  the corps, and has arranged  it on road. The column
     should seize  a dam and  provide approach of other  forces of the
     corps.  Approach of  a column  was provided  with 6-th  and 42-nd
     Jager Regiments, put forward to a dam and also with the artillery
     located at height on both sides of road.

     Owing  to different  reasons,  approach on  Saltanovka began  not
     simultaneously with approach on  Fatova as it was provided by the
     plan, but much later.

     Approach of the Smolensk Regiment in Saltanovka direction was met
     by strong fire of  the opponent. Russian armies have not trembled
     and continued  to be  advanced courageously. The  French command,
     aspiring to break attack of Russian column, has thrown against it
     a battalion of the  85-th regiment. This battalion has passed the
     spring below the bridge, with an intention to strike in the right
     flank of Russian column.

     Rayevsky  has  found  out  the threat  of  sudden  impact of  the
     opponent from the right  flank only when the column headed by him
     approached to a dam.  This threat was so dangerous, that Rayevsky
     was  compelled  to  turn  a column  from  a  dam  aside an  enemy
     battalion. As a result of persistent fight, Smolensk regiment has
     crushed French battalion.

     From captured, seized during  the fight, Rayevsky found out, that
     on  a direction  of actions  of the  7-th infantry  division, the
     French command concentrated the  basic forces of Davout's army in
     structure  up  to  five  divisions.  In  a kind  of  the  obvious
     superiority of forces of the opponent, and also considering, that
     operations of  the 7-th  infantry Division under  Saltanovka have
     held down  French troops and by that have  carried out a task put
     before them, Rayevsky did  not dare to renew attack and has given
     an order on a withdrawal.

     Bagration has approved this decision. Under Rayevsky's order, the
     7-th  infantry  corps  under   covering  of  rearguards  went  to
     Dashkovka in night for July, 12.

     Losses of Rayevsky's corps  were 2548 persons killed, wounded and
     disappeared. The french has lost 4134 men.

     Russian armies have shown  in this fight an exclusive heroism and
     courage. General Raevsky reported to Bagration:

     "A  united  bravery and  diligence  of the  Russian armies  might
     relieve me  from the destruction  by the superior enemy  and in a
     such unprofitable place for  me; I witness that many officers and
     soldiers being wounded twice  and having tied up these, came back
     in  battle  as on  a  feast. I  must  praise bravery  and art  of
     gunners: in this day everyone was a hero... "

     In  the order  to  the 2-nd  Western  army from  July, 13,  1812,
     Bagration has  declared gratitude  to generals, officers  and all
     troops, participated in fight  under Saltanovka. 409 soldiers and
     officers were awarded.

     With the  purpose to  enter the opponent in  error concerning the
     further actions of Russian army, Bagration has ordered to the 7th
     corps to  be at Dashkovka during 12 of  June, and asked Platov to
     direct  entrusted to  him cosscak  Corps on connection  with 1-st
     Western   army  on   the  left   shore  of  Dnepr   by  Mogilyov.

     In Bagration's opinion, it  should assure the French command that
     Russian are going to renew attack to Mogilyov both from the east,
     and from the south.

     On July,  12 Cossacks  had forwarded through  Dnepr at Vorkolabov
     and set on a  direction specified by Bagration. This very day the
     7-th infantry corps remained  at Dashkovka. The French, expecting
     attacks of  the opponent,  was at Mogilyov and  did not undertake
     any movements.

     In  the meantime at  Novy Bikhov  construction of the  bridge was
     completed,  and on  July, 13  a ferry  of 8-th infantry  and 4-th
     cavalry  corps has  began..On  next day  7-th infantry  corps has
     departed from  Dashkovka and  has made a ferry  through Dnepr and
     began movement after the main forces of army.

     The flank march of 2-nd Western army from Novy Bikhov to Smolensk
     was covered on the part of Mogilyov with a strong veil of Cossack
     Regiments. The army moved on route
     Propoysk-Cherykov-Krychev-Mstyslav-Khyslavichy-Smolensk.

     On July, 22 the  2nd Western army arrived to Smolensk where since
     July, 20  there stood  the 1st  Western army. Connection  of both
     armies  has  taken  place.  The  plan of  Napoleon  designed  for
     destruction of Russian army, was broken.

     The deviation maneuver of  the 2nd Western army from Volkovysk to
     Smolensk during the Great Patriotic War of 1812 belongs to number
     of  remarkable events  in  a history  of military  art. Bagration
     showed an outstanding sample  of a strategic management of armies
     in difficult fighting conditions.

     For 35  days, army  of Bagration, constantly having  the enemy in
     rear  and  on  flank,  have  passed  more  than  750  kms.  Daily
     transitions reached at times 35-40 kms.

     " Even  the great Suwaroff would  be surprised by those hardships
     people are  experinced nowadays and the  speed of marches of 2-nd
     army, in  all time done on sandy roads and  marshy places. . ." -
     Bagration wote.

     Skilfully maneuvering on a battlefield and waging persistent rear
     guard fights,  the Russian  army uder Bagration,  have managed to
     upset  plans  of  Napoleon  and to  leave  from  under impact  of
     superior forces of the enemy.

     The  Marche  - maneuver  of  2-nd  Western army  finished by  its
     connection  in  Smolensk  with  1-st  Western  army,  was  highly
     estimated by the contemporaries. So, the military writer of first
     half XIX in. N.A.Okunev specified:

     "Looking at  a map and taking in hands  for check a compasses, it
     is easy to be  convinced, even at a superficial sight, how little
     chances were left to prince Bagration for the achievement of this
     connection.  I consider,  as  you see,  person by  its  acts, and
     Prince.  Bagration by  his actions  and consequently, I  shall be
     alllowed, to  set one question: Whether  ever any general was put
     in more emergency conditions  and whether any militarian has left
     similar position with the greater honour? ".

     N.V.Golitsyn, one of aide-de-camps  of Bagration, also has fairly
     noticed:  "Fast and skilful movement to  which we are obliged for
     connection of Russian armies  near Smolensk, puts him (Bagration)
     in number of saviors of Russia in 1812".

     The French command, which did not manage to prevent connection of
     the 2-nd  army with  the 1-st Western  army, gave due  to skilful
     actions of  Russian armies.  On Bagration's words,  even "skilful
     Napoleon was  surprised" by  the march of  the 2nd  Western army.

     After  connection of  the  1-st and  the 2-nd  Western  armies in
     Smolensk favorable conditions for transition to offensive actions
     were created.

     Armies of  Napoleon were scattered, its  advanced parts were send
     in area Rudny, and  the others were on a march. It allowed to put
     defeat to the opponent  in parts, and Russian command has decided
     to take advantage. In  these purposes it has undertaken offensive
     on July 26. The  main impact was rendered on Rudny where parts of
     the  Murat's  3 rd  cavalry  corps  were located  at  that  time.

     The  decision of  Russian command  quite answered  conditions. At
     fast and resolute actions  it was possible to expect for route of
     Murat.  However   Barclay  de  Tolly  has   not  shown  necessary
     resoluteness.  Soon   the  direction  of  the   main  impact  was
     transferred  on  Porechye,  and  on  August, 1  again  on  Rudny.

     Napoleon  has taken  advantage  of a  sluggishness of  actions of
     Russian  command and  has  managed to  concentrate to  Smolensk a
     great bulk  of the  armies. On August,  1 the French  armies were
     forwarded through  Dnepr (in  70-80 kms to the  west of Smolensk)
     and  have led  approach  to Smolensk,  through Lyadi  and Krasny,
     having ordered to leave for rear to Russian armies and to cut off
     its ways of deviation to Moscow. Russian armies were compelled to
     stop  approach  and  have   begun  to  concentrate  in  Smolensk.

     Against French troops approaching  to Krasny, at first a group of
     Neverovsky  was  put forward,  and  then 7-th  infantry corps  of
     Rayevsky, which  restrained persevering attacks  of the opponent,
     aspiring to break to Smolensk, on August, 4.

     On 5 August Napoleon assumed to give Russian army near Smolensk a
     decisive  battle. In  a kind  of an  adverse ratio of  forces and
     danger of detour of Smolensk armies of the opponent, Russian army
     has left Smolensk in  night for August, 5 and was set to the east
     on  the Moscow  road. Defense  of Smolensk  was assigned  to 6-th
     infantry  corps of  Dokhturov with  divisions of  Neverovskyi and
     Konovnitsyn.

     In the  persistent battle which has  begun on August, 5, Russians
     have resisted  to all attacks of the  French armies and have kept
     city. Successfully having executed a task in view, Dokhturov have
     left Smolensk in night for August, 6and joined the main forces of
     Russian army.

     After  abandon  of Smolensk,  the  continuation  of deviation  of
     Russian armies already caused  resolute protests. Some blamed the
     imperial government and Barclay  de Tolly, as commander 1-st army
     and  military minister  for not  accepting vigorous  measures for
     preparation of forces to repulse the enemy.

     Being the supporter of the offensive strategy, Bagration insisted
     on  more   active  militay  actions  against   Napoleon.  He  was
     particurlaly  irated by  the  leadership of  the Russian  Army by
     Barclay  de  Tolly.  Bagration  have appealed  several  times  to
     Barclay for providing him  with an information on future plans of
     the Military command, but  all his claim were left without reply.

     "I  wrote  to you  twice,  but there  is  no answer  -  Bagration
     informed the  chief of a staff  of 1-st army general  Ermolov - I
     kindly ask  to report to minister where  does he make a direction
     of  army? I  wrote  to him,  but there  is  no answer.  I  do not
     understand, what  does it mean, what for you  run so and where do
     you  hasten?...  What is  happening  with  you, for  what do  you
     neglect  me? It  is not  right time  to joke.  If I write,  it is
     necessary to answer ".

     In another letter to Ermolov, characterizing the chaos reigned in
     armies, Bagration  declared: "Really, it is  easy to get mad from
     all these absurdity".

     Bagration sharply criticized Barclay de Tolly for his divergence.
     The  tense relations  between  both commanders  have reached  the
     maximum point.

     "I  can not  be  together with  minister  in any  way -  declared
     Bagration.  -  For God's  sake,  send  me anywhere  you want,  to
     cammand over  Regiment in Moldova, or to  Caucasus, but I can not
     be here; And all headquarters is filled with Germans so, that . .
     .  it   is  impossible   to  live  and   no  sense  to   do  it".

     All this rendered the  extremely negative influence on operations
     of  armies.  For rescue  of  position  it was  necessary to  unit
     command by armies in  hands of one commander, capable to mobilize
     economic and moral forces  of the country and to crush the enemy.
     Bagration  well  understood  importance  of realization  of  such
     action  and in the  reports to  Czar insisted on  introduction of
     one-man management. In this respect he reflected mood of majority
     of  Russian   army  which  demanded  assignment   of  the  single
     commander-in-chief   who   is   enjoying   confidence  of   army.

     "The order  and communication,  decent to the comfortable  army -
     wrote Bagration to Alexander  - demand always one-man management,
     and  more in  present  time when  business goes  about  rescue of
     fatherland, I  shall not  avoid from exact obedience  to the one,
     whom is destined to subordinate me".

     Under  pressure of  public opinion  Alexander I was  compelled to
     appoint M.I.Kutusoff as  the commander-in-chief all field armies.
     Assignment of  Kutusoff has met hot  approval of army and people.
     All  knew  him as  the  remarkable commander  which activity  was
     marked  by brilliant  victories of  Russain armies.  The majority
     trusted  Kutusoff. "Kutusoff  has arrived  to beat the  French" -
     spoke then.

     On 18 August Kutusoff has accepted command of army and since this
     day  vigorously  began  to  draft  the  strategic  plan  of  war.

     Taking into account aspiration  of Napoleon to achieve outcome of
     war by decisive battle, he dare to oppose him more appropriate to
     conditions of application of mass armies a way of the decision of
     outcome of war by system of consecutive battles.

     The great value in business of successful conducting war Kutusoff
     gave  to reserves.  Therefore right  after the assignment  he has
     become  interested in  a question  on available  reserves. Having
     found out, that reserves actually are not presented, Kutusoff has
     made  the decision  on  withdrawn of  army, then  to  exhaust the
     opponent in defensive fights, to strengthen own army by reserves,
     to change a ratio of forces in the advantage, and then to proceed
     in counterattack and to crush army of Napoleon.

     While  the  Russian  army  continued  deviation to  the  east  in
     accordance with  the plan of Kutusoff,  in the territory occupied
     by the French armies,  the guerrilla spontaneously arisen and its
     flame inflamed more and more.

     Bagration from the very beginning of war has correctly understood
     its features and national  character. He specified: "Nowadays the
     war is not ordinary, but National".

     That  is why  Bagration has  considered the  spontaneously arisen
     guerrilla with the great approval.

     In  the letter  to Rostopchyn  on August,  14 from  village Lusky
     (near Vyazma) he wrote:

     "Smolensk  province shows  patriotism rather well;  Local muzhiks
     (peasants)  beat the  French as  pigs where  only come  across in
     small commands".

     Explanation  of  character of  war  has  resulted in  Bagration's
     decision that the unique  means to detain progress of Napoleon in
     depth of Russia and to put him defeat is a guerrilla movement and
     its joint actions with Russian regular army.

     "To  me  it seems  that  there is  no  other a  way but,  without
     reaching two marches up  to Moscow, to gather all people and army
     and with  a cold  steel, peaks, sabres  and to pull  hard on them
     (french)... "  -- he wrote to  the governor of Moscow Rostopchyn.

     Bagration's views on a  role of guerrilla movement in war against
     the French  was shared  by his former  aide-de-camp, commander of
     the    Akhtyrsk   hussar   Regiment    vicecolonel   D.V.Davydov.

     Davydov has addressed to Bagration with the letter in which asked
     of  the sanction  to allocate  from structure  of Russian  army a
     small  group   for  actions   in  rear  of   the  French  armies.

     On August,  21 Bagration  has invited Davydov. It  was at Kolotsk
     monastery in  12 kms  to the west  from Borodino, where  then the
     headquarters of the 2-nd Western army settled down. Bagration has
     listened to  reasons Denysov on possible  character of actions of
     guerrilla group and has approved his intentions.

     Together  with  it,  Bagration  has  agreed  that  determined  by
     Kutusoff  number of  people was  not enough.  Thus he  has added:

     "I  do  not  understand  fears  His  Brightness.  Whether  it  is
     necessary  to bargain  because of  several hundreds  persons when
     business goes that in case of good luck, he may deprive the enemy
     of all  supplies. . . .  In case of failure,  he will lose only a
     handful  of   people.  How  to  be,   war  is  not  for  kisses".

     Davydov  has assured,  that he  warrants for integrity  of group.

     "For  this purpose,  only  boldness in  attacks, resoluteness  in
     abrupt cases and caution  on halts and lodgings for the night are
     necessary; for  this I  shall do my  best... Only, I  repeat, the
     number of  people is too limited, give  me 1000 cossacks, and you
     will see, that will be" - has told Davydov.

     "I  would give  you at first  time 3000  of them -  have answered
     Bagration -  for I do not like to  act superficially, but can not
     even speak about it;  Knyaz has defined force of a group himself;
     it is necessary to obey".

     After that  Bagration has  sat down and  wrote with own  hand the
     following instruction to Davydov:

     "To   Vicecolonel    of   Akhtyrsk   Hussar   Regiment   Davydov.

     After  reception  of  this,  take  hundred  fifty  cossacks  from
     general-major Karpov's  and fifty  hussar of the  Akhtyrsk hussar
     Regiment.

     I order  to take all measures to disturb the  enemy and to try to
     take away its supplies not only from flanks, but in middle and in
     rear, to upset transports and parks, to break ferries and to take
     away all remedies. In a word to tell, I am sure, that having made
     to  you  such  an  important  allowance,  you  shall  prove  your
     quickness and diligence and  that will justify my choice. You can
     sent official  reports to me at  every convenient chance you will
     have;  Nobody should know  about your  movements and try  to have
     them  in  the  most  impenetrable secret.  As  if  to  up to  the
     foodstuffs  of  your  command,  you  should take  care  about  it
     yourself...".

     Then Bagration  write letters to generals  Vasilchikov and Karpov
     about  allocation of  the best  cossacks and the  hussars. Having
     informed by  Davydov, that he has no  a map of Smolensk province,
     Bagration  has given him  an own  map. On farewell  Bagration has
     told Davydov,  that he hoped on  success of the conceived affair.

     Hopes of  Bagration were  justified. Guerrilla movement  has soon
     received wide scope. Beside Davydov's group, groups under command
     of  general Dorokhov,  captain Fisher, captain  Seslavin, colonel
     Kudashev  and  others  were  created. These  groups  successfully
     struggled  with the  French, combining  the actions  with peasant
     guerrilla groups.

     The given facts testify that Bagration was one of the first among
     the  commanders  of  Russian  army of  that  time,  who has  paid
     attention to  necessity to develop guerrilla  movement and use of
     peasants and regular military parts.

     Bagration was  the first during that  war who organized the first
     military unit for conducting  guerrilla movement. He also was the
     author of  the first  instruction in which  has precisely defined
     purposes   of  this   group   and  character   of  its   actions.

     On August, 22 Russian army has left in area Borodino. Under order
     of Kutusoff active preparation  for forthcoming battle began on a
     favourable defensive position.

     The position  choosed by  kutusoff, occupied 8 kms  on front. Its
     first line passed on line Maslovo, Gorky, Borodino, Semyenovskoe,
     Utytsa.  The   right  flank   of  a  position   adjoined  to  the
     Moscow-river  at  Maslovo,  and   the  left  flank  -  to  almost
     impassable Utytsk forest. The  centre was based on Kurgan height.

     The Borodino  position covered  two important ways  which went to
     Moscow- New Smolensk road and Old Smolensk road on which the army
     of Napoleon moved.

     Kutusoff highly estimated the Borodino position. In the report to
     Alexander dated  on August, 23 1812 he wrote  to Alexander: " the
     position  in which  I have  stopped at  a village Borodino  in 12
     miless forward  Mozhaisk, is  one of the  best that only  on flat
     places  is possible to  find... It  Is desirable, that  the enemy
     attack  us  in this  positions  then I  have  the big  hope to  a
     victory".

     The most  vulnerable site  of the Borodino position  was its left
     flank. Kutusoff well understood it and in the report to Alexander
     wrote:  " the weak place of this position  is located on the left
     flank, and I shall try to correct it ".

     Kutusoff has  put the most proof armies  of the 2-nd Western army
     of  Bagration  on  the  left flank.  Besides  he  has ordered  to
     strengthen this flank  by earthen constructions. At Semyenovskoe,
     three  redoubts, the  so  called "fleshies"  ("fleshy" -  a field
     strengthening which  sides form  a stupid outgoing  corner), were
     constructed, that received  subsequently the name of "Bagration's
     fleshies",  as  during  the  Borodino battle  Bagration's  troops
     courageously defended them.

     To the  west from Semyenovskoe an  advanced strengthening, the so
     called Shevardyn Redoubt was located.

     At Kurgan height there was 18-cannon battery known under the name
     of "Rayevsky's battery".

     Kutusoff intended  to wage  a defensive battle  with Napoleon, to
     make possible big losses  with the purpose of changing of a ratio
     of forces  in the advantage and in a  case of a favorable outcome
     to proceed in approach against French army.

     The fighting  order of Russian army  consisted of the right wing,
     the centre, the left wing and reserves.

     On a  right wing  from Maslovo up  to Gorky the  2nd and  the 4th
     infantry and 2nd cavalry corps were deployed.

     In the  centre - from Gorky  up to Kurgan heights  - Kutusoff has
     put the 6th infantry and 3rd cavalry corps.

     The general  command by armies  of the right wing  and the centre
     was assigned on Barclay de Tolly.

     On  the  left,  most dangerous  wing,  armies  of Bagration  were
     settled down:  the 7 th and 8 th infantry and 4 th cavalry corps.

     The  area of Utizy  was defended  by six Cossack  Regiments under
     Karpov.  Here  Kutusoff  has  ordered to  arrange  also  the 3 rd
     infantry  corps  under command  of  N. A.Tuchkov,  having put  it
     almost perpendicular  to the 8th  infantry corps. The opurpose of
     the 3rd infantry corps was to be in readiness to operate in flank
     and rear to napoleonic armies.

     However  the  chief of  Kutusoff's  staff  general Bennigsen  has
     broken performance of this order. On the eve of battle he has put
     Tuchkov;s  corps   in  front   to  the  opponent   that  did  not
     corresponded to an order assigned by Kutusoff.

     The  great attention was  given by  Kutusoff to creation  and the
     savings of  reserves.  "... Reserves -  he specified  - should be
     saved as long as  possible, since the general who will keep still
     a reserve, is not defeated".

     Bagration also  considered the presence of  reserves as extremely
     necessary. In  the order to the  army on the eve  of the Borodino
     battle he wrote:  "Ii is necessary to have strong reserves and to
     locate   them   as   close   as  possible   to   strengthenings".

     Kutusoff had  in reserve the following  troops: the 5-th infantry
     corps and 1st  Cuirassier Division, settled down at Knyazkov. The
     artillery  reserve (306  canons) was  assembled at  Psarev. These
     forces made  the main reserve which  might be used as  on a right
     wing and in the centre, and on the left wing.

     Besides each  wing had  special reserves. A reserve  of the right
     wing was made by 9 Cossack Regiments under M.I.Platov and the 1st
     Cavalry Corps under F. P.Uvarov.

     The reserve  of the left wing consisted of  the 2nd Grenadier and
     the 2 nd Cuirassier  Divisions, the Don artillery  and a separate
     artillery reserve of the  left wing. This reserve was arranged to
     the east from Semyenovskoe.

     Having  considered  Russian positions,  Napoleon  has decided  to
     strike  on the  left  flank of  fighting construction  of Russain
     army, to break through  here its defense, to leave in rear and to
     destroy, having pressed to the Moscow - river.

     Napoleon has concentrated a great bulk of the army on a direction
     of the  main impact. Corps  of Murat, Davout, Ney  and Junot were
     located  here. With  the purpose  of concealing direction  of the
     main  impact,  Napoleon  planned  demonstrative  actions  against
     Borodino and Utizy.

     On August,  24 there was a  fight for Shevardyn Redoubt. Napoleon
     has set against it 30 thousand infantries, 10 thousand cavalrymen
     and 186 canons. Russian has opposed them 8 thousand infantries, 4
     thousand cavalrymen with 36 canons.

     Both sides were fighting with a great courage and boldness. After
     several attacks  French managed to seize  redoubt. Then Bagration
     sent two divisions to assist defenders of the redoubt, which beat
     out the French by vigorous counterattack.

     On next day in the order to Russian army Kutusoff wrote: "the hot
     affair, happened yesterday on the left flank, finished to a glory
     of the Russian army".

     Fight  for Shevardyn  Redoubt had  a big  value. It  has provided
     Russian army with an  opportunity to finish erection of the basic
     engineering    constructions    on    the   Borodino    position.
     Simultaneously this fight has  made clear Napoleon's intention to
     put   main   impact   against   left  wing   of   Russian   army.

     Considering, that  Russian armies  have carried out  the task put
     before them,  Kutusoff has  ordered Bagration to  allocate armies
     from Shevardyn redoubt.

     With approach  of darkness  Bagration's troops have  left redoubt
     and occupied defense position on Borodino.

     During  August,   25  (6   September)  both  parties   made  last
     preparations for  forthcoming battle. The French  army totaled in
     135 thousand  men and 587 canons. (W.Sloane  in his book "Life of
     Napoleon wrote  that "He had a  hundred and twenty-eight thousand
     men   at   hand,   and   six  thousand   more   within   reach".)

     In Russian army there  were 120 thousand soldiers and 640 canons.

     The Borodino battle began  on dawn of August, 26 (7 September) by
     a powerful artillery cannonade  from both sides. Then approach of
     the French  on Borodion has  followed, which was in  front of the
     Russian positions and was defended by Jagers.

     The Jagers after firm  resistance were compelled to move to river
     Kalacha under  an impact  of superior forces of  the enemy. These
     attacks of  the French carried demonstrative  character. The main
     events were developed at "Bagration's fleshies" and at battery of
     Rayevsky.

     About  at  6  am,   an  army  of  marshal  Davout  have  attacked
     Bagration's  positions. It  had  up to  25 thousand  men  and was
     supported by 102 canons.

     "Bagration's  fleshies" were  defended  by the  Summary Grenadier
     Division  under  command  of  Vorontsov  and the  27 th  infantry
     division under  leadership of  Neverovsky. In total  there were 8
     thousand Russians and 50 canons.

     Despite of the threefold  superiority of the opponent over people
     and double  - in artilleries, Russians  had high moral spirit and
     confidence  in the  forces. "In  their first onset  they advanced
     like devotees,  with the cry,  "God have mercy upon  us!" and, as
     each forward rank went down before the relentless invaders, those
     behind pressed onward over the bodies of their comrades." - wrote
     W. Sloagne in his book "Life of Napoleon".

     Russians have  met attacking columns of  the French with a strong
     artillery fire. Simultaneously Russian Jagers, scattered in front
     of fleshies, have opened  gun fire on the opponent. The enemy has
     not sustained storm fire  of Russian armies and, leaving a lot of
     killed and wounded, has receded in the disorder.

     The  first attack  of  the French  on "Bagration's  fleshies" has
     choked.

     At 7 am the  French has renewed attacks. With the big losses they
     managed to grasp left  fleshies. However under order of Bagration
     some   battalions   of   27-th   infantry   division   vigorously
     counterattacked the  opponent in flank. The  French were beat off
     and suffered new heavy losses.

     The second attack on  "Bagration's fleshies" also has finished in
     failure for the French.

     Napoleon  was struck  with  persistent resistance  of Bagration's
     troops. He  has supported Davout with corps  of Ney and Junot and
     Murat's  cavalry and  has given  an order to  attack "Bagration's
     fleshies" in third time.

     In  his   turn,  Bagration  has   considerably  strengthened  his
     positions.  He has  put forward in  this area  the reserve -  2nd
     Grenadier  and 2 nd Cuirrassier  divisions. Also he  has directed
     here  8  battalions from  the  7 th corps  of  Raevsky that  were
     deployed to  the north  from fleshies. Besides Bagration  put the
     3  rd   infantry  division   of   Konovnitsyn  at   Semyenovskoe.

     Kutusoff  who  was  watching  closely development  of  battle  at
     "Bagration's fleshies", has  sent large reserves on strengthening
     Bagration's positions.  He ordered to throw  on the left wing the
     2-nd and a part  of 5-th infantry corps, and also 100 canons from
     the main  artillery reserve.  However relocation of  these forces
     might be  carried out  not earlier, than in  l-2 hours. Therefore
     Bagrationi  might rely only  for his  own forces during  the next
     enemy attack.

     At  8  am after  powerful  artillery  fire, the  third attack  on
     "Bagration's fleshies" began. The French managed to rush in right
     and left  fleshies. However on this  time Bagration's troops have
     beaten them out from there by a prompt counterattack and restored
     position by 9 am.

     Simultaneously with the third attack, the forces of Poniatowski's
     corps attacked  Utizy with the purpose to  leave for rear of army
     of Bagration, but the  3rd infantry corps of Tuchkov has repulsed
     this  attack and,  thus,  has broken  roundabout maneuver  of the
     opponent.

     Napoleon  was  in  fury from  new  failure.  He has  strengthened
     Davout's and  Ney's corps by sending  corps of Murat and  at 9 am
     the French have undertaken the fourth attack.

     They  has managed  to  seize fleshies  and village  Semyenovskoe.
     However to  this time  the 2nd and  5th corps that  were sent for
     strengthening  of  2 nd  army  of  Bagration,  began  to  arrive.
     Bagration   throw   all    his   forces   against   the   French.

     The  French armies were  again rejected  with the big  losses for
     them. Fourth  attack "Bagration's fleshies" also  has finished in
     failure.

     Without considering suffered losses, Napoleon decided to to seize
     "Bagration's fleshies" by all means.

     At 10 am the  French has undertaken the fifth attack; at 10.30 am
     - the sixth; at 11 - the seventh. (!!!)

     However all these attacks were rebuffed.

     With a view of counteraction to an impact of the French, Kutusoff
     continued to  strengthen armies  of the left wing.  He has thrown
     there  the 4 th infantry and  2nd  cavalry corps. Besides  he has
     prepared courageous  maneuver with  the purpose of  impact on the
     left flank and rear of the opponent. For performance of this task
     he choose Coossack Regiments  of Platov and 1-st Cavalry corps of
     Uvarov.

     At  12   am  the  French  have   started  the  eighth  attack  on
     "Bagration's fleshies". By this time against 18 thousand soldiers
     and  300 canons of  Bagration, Napoleon  has set 45  thousand men
     with 400 canons.

     At  that  moment, Bagration  has  decided  to meet  the enemy  by
     decisive impact. Fierce  counter hand-to-hand fight was fastened.

     Military  historian  Buturlin,  the  participant of  this  fight,
     wrote:  "An  awful combat  took place,  in which from  both sides
     miracles of almost supernatural  bravery were made. The infantry,
     cavalrymen  and  gunners  of  both  sides, having  got  mixed  up
     together,  represented  an awful  show  of  a wrong  bulk of  the
     soldiers  altercating in  private  with furiousness  of despair".

     It was  exactly this  moment when Bagration  was fatally wounded.
     The splinter  of the French grenade  has struck him in  a leg and
     has  reset from  a  horse. But  Bagration has  not  lost courage.

     "When he  was wounded -  wrote N.B.Golitsyn - he,  despite of the
     sufferings,  wanted to  wait  for consequences  of attack  of the
     second cuirrasier division and  to make sure with own eyes of its
     success; after that, having  felt sincere simplification, he left
     a battle-field".

     The  message  about  Bagration's  injury has  made  confusion  in
     armies. The management of  armies was broke and under pressure of
     superior forces  of the enemy Russians  were compelled to depart.

     " This  unfortunate occasion -  wrote Kutuzov to  Alexander - has
     rather  upset successful  action of  the left our  wing, hitherto
     having a superiority above the enemy..."

     After wounding  of Bagration, temporary command  of armies of the
     left wing  has taken up  by Konovnitsyn who was  soon replaced by
     Dokhturov.

     Russian armies  retreated and occupied Semyenovskoe. "Bagration's
     fleshies" have remained in hands of the French.

     Napoleon has decided to  enter into battle the reserve - Imperial
     Guard  and  to complete  break  of  a position  of Russian  army.
     Position  was exclusively  intense. At  this time under  order of
     Kutusoff,  Platov  and Uvarov  have  bypassed the  left flank  of
     Napoleon's army and have undertaken sudden attack in area Valuem,
     Bezubovo.

     The panic  in a transport and among troops  of the left flank has
     forced Napoleon to stop  attacks against the 2nd Western army and
     to  distract  for  setback   of  sudden  attack  for  two  hours.

     This  fact has allowed  Kutusoff to  rearrange the armies  and to
     strengthen  the  centre  and  the  left wing.  The  new  attempts
     undertaken by Napoleon to break through defense of Russian armies
     had  no success. Napoleon  managed only  to grasp the  battery of
     Rayevsky.

     By the  end of  day Russian army  strongly stood on  the Borodino
     position. Having  convinced of futility of  the attacks, Napoleon
     has  given an order  to allocate  armies on an  initial boundary.

     So  famous  Borodino   battle  was  finished.  Kutusoff  informed
     Alexander about  its results on August,  29 (September, 10) 1812:
     "This battle,  that took place on 26-th,  was the most bloody was
     of  all that  are known in  newest times.  The place of  fight is
     gained  by us  completely,  and the  enemy retired  then  in that
     position in which has come to attack us".

     The question  of a  victory in the Borodino  battle always caused
     fierce  contradiction.  To my  mind,  Napoleon  won the  Borodino
     battle,  but   at  the  same  time,   lost  the  whole  campaign.

     Therefore,  the Borodino  battle was  a great victory  of Russian
     army.  As a  result  of battle  serious  losses were  put to  the
     opponent  and  the plan  of  Napoleon  to crush  Russian army  in
     decisive battle was broken.

     The  French army  has lost  about 58  thousand soldiers  from 135
     thousand men. Losses of  Russian army have made about 44 thousand
     soldiers.

     Especially considerable  role in the Borodino  battle have played
     armies under  command of  Bagration. Operating on  a direction of
     the main impact of  the opponent, they have courageously repulsed
     numerous attacks  of the enemy and  in many respects promoted the
     general victory of Russian army.

     "This  day -  wrote Kutusoff,  - will  be an eternal  monument of
     courage and excellent bravery  of the Russian soldiers, where all
     infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. The desire of
     everyone was  to die on a place and to  not concede to the enemy.
     The  French  army  under leadership  of  Napoleon,  being in  the
     superior forces,  has not  overcome determination of  the Russian
     soldier  endowing with  a courage  its life for  the fatherland".

     After  a  victory gained  in  the Borodino  battle, Russian  army
     prepared  for transition  in approach  with the purpose  of final
     route of  Napoleon's army. However the  big losses and absence of
     necessary  reserves for  development  of approach  have compelled
     commander-in-chief Kutusoff  to give an order  on a withdrawal to
     Moscow. It  enabled Russian  army to fill losses  and to continue
     war in more favourable conditions.

     "... When business goes not about glories of the fights won only,
     but  all  purposes  are directed  on  destruction  of the  French
     army... I have taken intention to recede... " - informed Kutusoff
     Alexander.

     With a deviation of  Russian army from Borodino the new period of
     the Grea patriotic War  of 1812 has begun. In this period Russian
     army under the leadership of Kutusoff has skilfully carried out a
     flank  march to  Tarutino,  finished there  preparation for  wide
     offensive actions  and, having pass in  a resolute counterattack,
     defeated Napoleon's armies.

     Bagration  was  not fated  to  participate in  all these  events.
     Evacuated to  a village.  Simy in Vladimir province,  he has died
     there from the received  wound on September, 14, ( 26 ) 1812. The
     account of his days has stopped, not achieving complete 47 years.

     On   September,   17,  in   day   of   funeral  Bagrationa,   the
     general-aide-de-camp Sen-Pry was  the only from Bagration's close
     people on mourning ceremony in Simy. And that only because, being
     itself    wounded,   appeared    on   vicinity    on   treatment.

     On 25th anniversary  of the Borodino battle, which was celebrated
     rather  solemnly, it  was decided  to set  up on a  battlefield a
     memorable obelisk in honour of falling heroes.

     Then  famous Denis  Davydov, who  has offered emperor  Nikolay to
     transfer ashes of the great commander and the hero of war of 1812
     to bottom of this  monument, was still alive. So the place worthy
     to great Bagration was finally determined.

     There is  Peter Bagrationa's  huge share in a  victory of Russian
     army  in the  Great Patriotic  War of  1812. The  Russian armies,
     under his  command, have put serious  defeats on French armies by
     the  skilful actions  during  deviation and  during the  Borodino
     fight.

     Bagration took place in history of military art as the remarkable
     commander  who   has  brought   in  the  large   contribution  to
     development of advanced ways of conducting the armed struggle. He
     has  shown  outstanding  examples  of  the  skilful  decision  of
     complex)  strategic and  tactical tasks on  various battlefields.

     " Suwaroff's disciple -  wrote about Bagration S.G.Volkonsky - he
     never betray  to the instructor and  up to the end  of life was a
     Glory of the Russian army"

     Being  the talented  representative  of the  Suwaroff's strategy,
     Bagration together with other progressive figures of Russian army
     of the end XVIII - the beginnings XIX centuries. was a carrier of
     advanced military ideas of that time.

     Highly gifted by nature,  the person of "wise and flexible mind",
     he  has given  the practical  decision of some  radical problems.

     In the field of strategy, the one of the sharpest questions was a
     definition of ways of  achievement of a fast and resolute victory
     above  the   opponent.  Then   out-of-date  prussian,  positional
     strategy was still "alive", however new strategic sights affirmed
     on  behalf  of Napoleonic  and  Suwaroff's strategy  went on  its
     change.

     As against  adherents the positional strategy,  who gave deciding
     value to  struggle for  fortresses and the  communications of the
     opponent,  supporters  of new  strategic  sights  brought to  the
     forefront idea the destruction  of opponent's alive force in open
     field  battles. They  rejected  the requirement  of old  strategy
     about equal distribution of forces and means on a battlefield for
     maintenance  of all  directions and  persistently carried  out an
     idea on  necessity of  massing of forces  and means on  the major
     strategic directions  for drawing distressed impact  on the enemy
     as  best means  of achievement  of a  fast and  complete victory.

     Conductors  of   new  resolute  strategy  in   Russian  army  was
     A.V.Suwaroff  and whole  group of  his followers, among  whom was
     Bagration.

     Bagration's practice has given many vivid examples of the skilful
     decision of  tasks in view of  new strategy. Especially evidently
     it was showed in his actions in the rank of the
     commander-in-chief  of the  Moldavian army  and during  the Great
     Patriotic War of 1812. Bagration acted as the commander-innovator
     putting  before   Russian  army  resolute   strategic  tasks  and
     rejecting becoming obsolete positional strategy.

     The forms of the armed struggle used by Bagration corresponded to
     his advanced sights on character of a strategy. Under his command
     the  Russian  armies  gave  instructive  examples  of  conducting
     offensive   and  defensive   actions.  If   conditions  developed
     adversely, Bagration used also  such compelled form of conducting
     military actions, as deviation.

     But  he considered  as  the basic  form of  conducting  the armed
     struggle  an  offensive  actions, for  only  by  approach it  was
     possible to  achieve route of alive force  of the opponent and to
     achieve the strategic purpose  in the shortest terms. "... In all
     cases -  wrote Bagration - I prefer  offensive war to a defensive
     one "

     Strategic views of Bagration defined also his sights on character
     of tactical  actions of armies. It  is possible to estimate these
     sights, for example, on  axample of the famous order to armies of
     2-nd Western army dated on June, 25, 1812.

     In the  order, written  by Bagration with  own hand, instructions
     were given  to the 2nd  Western army concerning a  way of actions
     against  the  French  armies  invaded  on  territory  of  Russia.

     "To us -  it was spoken in the order -  it is necessary to attack
     them bravely, quickly, to  not be engaged in shootings; artillery
     must fire precisely; irregullar armies must try to surround their
     flanks and rear .  . . . The regular cavalry attacks quickly, but
     rather harmonous,  without dividing. Squadrons  must support each
     other in attack, having  covered reserves and flanks. The cavalry
     should be located under the chess order".

     Attack should be conducted, having armies constructed in columns.

     "Commanders of  Corps - wrote  Bagration - must  try and turn all
     attention on attacking the  enemy with bayonets in columns and to
     attack  till its  deviation. The  horse artillery  should operate
     strongly, equally as a cavalry, but rather harmonous, without the
     slightest confusion. It is rather necessary in the case, when the
     enemy will have strong reserves and may confuse attacking forces;
     and  for  that we  must  try to  have  armies in  columns and  in
     readiness,  and  as  soon  as  everyone turn  into  flight,  then
     cossacks must prick them,  while regular must support closefisted
     and rather harmoniously".

     Bagration recommended  to deploy  army in the  fighting order not
     too close,  but in a  way that soldiers might  concern each other
     elbows.

     On  a  case  of  counterattacks  of  a cavalry  of  the  opponent
     Bagration offered to arrange "carres".

     "When the enemy cavalry  will attack infantry - was spoken in the
     order -  that a same  minute to construct either  a column closed
     from all sides, or a battalion in a carre".

     With the purpose of  increasing enthusiasm of armies, all attacks
     should be made with a shout, during approach to beat drums and to
     play a music.

     Similar  sights  were stated  Bagrationii  in a  number of  other
     orders,  instructions   and  letters.  In   particular,  for  the
     characteristic of his tactical  sights may serve also the "Manual
     to infantry officers in day of battle".

     This  document was  made on  a basis  of "Manuals to  officers of
     Narva infantry  Regiment" which author  was M.S.Vorontsov serving
     during  the Great  Patriotic  War 1812  in 2-nd  Western  army of
     Bagrationa.

     Under the  witness of military  historian P.Simansky, Vorontsov's
     manual  "as made  under strong influence  of Suwaroff's precepts,
     was appraised by the  most favourite disciple of Suwaroff, Prince
     Bagration,  then it  was slightly  corrected by  him, as  in some
     places  it concerned  only Narva  infantry Regiment, and  then in
     July,  1812  it was  dispatched  to  all troops  of  2-nd army" .

     "Manual to infantry officers  in day of battle" recognized as the
     basic kind  of fight  an offensive fight. The  main perfomance of
     fight was a bayonet  attack, coming up to the end with a vigorous
     prosecution of the crushed opponent.

     "Manual"  considered in  detail  a question  on actions  separate
     linesand in  columns, about conducting aimed  fire. The necessity
     of maintenance by shooters  of a close communication with columns
     was specified;  movement forward was determined  only by an order
     of the  chief of  division or battalion.  If it was  necessary to
     operate in  separate line in forests  , it was offered  to hold a
     reserve behind  one of flanks in order  to have an opportunity to
     put   sudden   flank   impact   on   counterattacking   opponent.

     Attack of an enemy  cavalry acting in separate line should be met
     by fire, having admitted the opponent on 150 steps. After that it
     was necessary to be  divided on small groups of 10 persons and to
     repulse the  opponent by fire and bayonets  up to the approach of
     reinforcements.  Upon   approaching,  reinforcements  had  to  be
     reconstructed  from  a  column into  carre,  firing  on an  enemy
     cavalry from a distance in 150 steps.

     "Manual"  demanded  from  officers   to  show  constant  care  of
     soldiers, to  remind their  duties and the oath,  to explain what
     was required  from the them during  military actions. The special
     attention  was addressed  on maintenance  in armies of  belief by
     virtue of  "Russian bayonets", a spirit  of boldness, courage and
     persistence in fight.

     "The persistence and courage  - was spoken in "Manual" - have won
     more  battles,  rather  than   all  talents  taken  altogether" .

     Dissemination of  all panic hearings, like  "we are cut off" were
     categorically forbidden, under a threat of severe punishments. it
     was  specified in  "Manual":  "Brave  people are  never  cut off;
     wherever the  enemy goes,  turn your breast to  follow and defeat
     him".

     Thus,  in  the field  of  tactics, as  well  as in  the field  of
     strategy, Bagration acted as the innovator of new ideas convinced
     by the  supporter of  resolute offensive actions  He persistently
     introduced  advanced  tactics  went  on  change  to  an  obsolete
     positional tactics,  applied tactics of columns  in a combination
     with separate lines.

     Paying a great attnetion to a value of offensive fight, Bagration
     at  the same  time did  not reject  an opportunity  of conducting
     defensive activity.  He creatively approached to  the decision of
     tasks  in view,  applying such  forms of  fight, that  were exact
     answers  to particular  circumstances. His  practical inheritance
     contains  the  richest  experience  of  conducting  an  offensive
     battles  as well as  development of  practice of waging  an avant
     guard and rear guard fights.

     Bagaration was  the unsurpassed  master of organization  of these
     extremely complex  kinds of  fights. And not casually  is that at
     the most responsible and crucial moments of wars of 1799-1807, he
     was appointed as commander  of rear guards and avant guard of the
     Russian army.

     The  fights,  carried out  by  Russian  armies under  Bagration's
     leadership during  the Italian  campaign of 1799,  and also avant
     guard and rear guard fights during the Swiss campaign of 1799 and
     wars of  Russia with France of 1805-1807  belong to number of the
     best in  Russian military  art. Bagration built  an education and
     training  processes  of  soldiers  on  the basis  of  the  system
     developed by A.V. Suwaroff.  He paied great attention to training
     and  education of  armies  to prepare  the courageous,  brave and
     initiative  soldier  capable  to  carry out  orders  quickly  and
     skillfully.

     Bagration  constantly worried  about the  soldiers to  be health,
     well dressed and be  fed in time. S.G.Volkonsky, which during war
     of Russia with France  of 1806-1807 frequently was in Bagration's
     group, wrote:

     "...I  visited several  times an  avant guarde  where many  of my
     friends   were  serving   at  Prince   Bagration's  headquarters.
     Hospitable manner of Prince with subordinates, amicable relations
     between themselves, harmony, cleanliness in tents, fresh, pleased
     appearance of the bottom  grades - proved Prince's good treatment
     and attitude to them,  and in all the pledge of the general trust
     to him".

     Cases  of  the  careless  attitude  of  separate  chiefs  to  the
     subordinates caused the feeling of deep indignation of Bagration.
     For example, in the order to armies of the 2nd Western army dated
     on  February,  13,  (  25  )  1812, Bagration  underlined  a  bad
     organization  of  treatment  at  the  11 th  Jager  Regiment  and
     specified,  that  soldiers  are  left without  any  attention  of
     careless  doctor Baranovich,  whom  "I  order to  arrest  for one
     month..."

     But showing  a carefulness of the  soldier, Bagration at the same
     time   demanded   maintenance   of   high  military   discipline,
     considering  it  as  a  foundation of  a  military  service.  "In
     military service  - he wrote  - the first subject  is an order, a
     subordination,    discipline,    unanimity    and    friendship".

     First  of  all  Bagration  was  extremely  demanded  to  his  own
     personality.  "...To execute a will  of sovereign, of the emperor
     and my commanders is the most sacred obligation to which I follow
     and  obey on  every  step of  my  service... I  Love soldiers,  I
     respect   their  bravery,   and  equally   I  demand   an  order,
     discipline".

     Armies,  commanded by  Bagration,  were always  differed of  high
     discipline and,  in some sense, this was  one of the main reasons
     of their brilliant victories over enemies.

     Bagration's  military achievements  had brought  a huge  glory to
     him. "The God of an army" ("Bog (the God)-rati(army)-on (he is)")
     - so  he was named  in Russian army. Bagration's  name was widely
     known not only in  Russia, but also is far behind its boundaries.

     Many outstanding  military figures of the  Western Europe of that
     time have highly estimated his military talent. So, in opinion of
     Polish  general Kolachkovsky,  one  of the  participants of  1812
     campaign,  Bagration  "belonged to  a number  of the  most famous
     military leaders  of his time" and might be  put in one line with
     the  glorified   military  commanders  like  Napoleon,  Suwaroff,
     Kutusoff, Ney, Davout and many others.

     Napoleon  himself considered  Bagration  as the  best general  of
     Russian army.



                               Bibliography

  1. General Bagration, Summary of documents and materials, published by
     Gospolizdat, 1945 (in Russian)
  2. The Great Patriotic War 1812, Materials of the Military archive of the
     General Headquarters, Moscow 1910-1911
  3. Field-marshal Kutusoff, "Summary of documents and materials", Moscow,
     1947 (in Russian)
  4. Denis Davydov, Memoirs, Moscow, 1985 (In Russian)
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  6. E. Tarle, "Napoleon's campaign in Russia, 1812", Moscow, 1989 (in
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  7. S. Borysov "Bagration", Moscow, published by the Ministry of Defense,
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  8. I. Rostunov, "Bagration", Moscow, 1957 (in Russian)
  9. V. Zherve, "Heroes of 1812, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration", Moscow
     (in Russian)
 10. A. Jorjadze "Military art of Georgians", Tbilisi, 1989 (In Georgian)
 11. B. Sokhvadze "Barclay de Tolly during 1812", Tbilisi, 1995 (In
     Georgian)
 12. Military Encyclopedia, volume IV (in Russian)
 13. I. Polosyn "Bagration", Moscow, 1950
 14. W. Sloane, "The Life of Napoleon", New York, 1896 (in English)
 15. Clauzewitz "Napoleon's russian campaign, 1812", Moscow, 1957 (In
     Russian)



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 2000, design by Logunov Eugene. Creative artel of the Project 1812 year.
                   http://www.museum.ru/museum/1812/